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Abstract
On the Existence of a Behavioral Component to the Business Cycle, by Zhaochen He. Thesis Committee:
Donald Cox (Chair), Peter Ireland, Mathis Wagner
This dissertation consists of two essays which address the origins of the business cycle. In particular, it
asks: to what extent do behavioral or psychological effects, famously termed “animal spirits” by John Maynard
Keynes, contribute to the amplification of business cycle fluctuations.
The first essay, titled “The Labor Market Effects of Bad Economic News”, examines the effects of eco-
nomically pessimistic newspaper articles on hiring and employment patterns. Combining information on
newspaper subscriptions with automated content analysis of newspaper articles, the paper reconstructs the
flow of pessimistic news across the United States during the past recession on a county-by-county, quarter-
by-quarter basis. This high resolution map of pessimistic news delivery is then used to estimate the causal
impact of media pessimism on labor market outcomes. Exposure to negative news is found to suppress hiring
and total employment during the early stages of the recession by up to 40% compared to pre-recession levels;
overall, media pessimism can account for some 7% of jobs lost between 2007 and 2010. Further analysis of
Google search data suggests that this contractionary effect is mediated by changes in public attitude caused
by exposure to pessimistic stories in the media.
Importantly, this study considers only articles which report negative news about the state of the national
economy, rather than stories which focus on local events. It argues that the prevalence of such news stories
affects local labor market conditions, but is unlikely to be affected by such conditions. This approach helps to
address the simultaneity issues which have dogged previous research on the topic.
The second essay, titled “Uncertainty and Risk Averse Firms in DSGE” a develops theoretical framework
to rationalize the previous paper’s empirical results. This paper solves a simple general equilibrium model
in which firms are risk averse over future profits in a manner analogous to household risk aversion. It shows
that response to increased economic uncertainty - particularly uncertainty with regards to future consumer
demand, economies with risk averse firms are likely to undergo a business cycle contraction.
This result also addresses a long standing problem in the RBC literature; namely, how to generate a con-
traction with a keynesian demand side shock. In most models with risk averse utility-maximizing households,
a reduction in aggregate demand due to consumer-side changes is expansionary. The paper argues that by in-
troducing firm-side risk aversion into the model, this counter-intuitive behavior can be corrected in a realistic
and parsimonious manner.
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Introduction
There are two broadly differing schools of thought on the origins of recession. The real business cycle paradigm, ubiquitous in
modern macroeconomic research, posits that economic booms and busts constitute efficient reactions of the economy’s primary
markets to changes in economic fundamentals. These changes, or “shocks”, can come in a variety of forms, the most popular of
which is a change to the underlying production technology. In the context of a DSGE model, such shocks can lead to co-movement
between macroeconomic aggregates such as output and consumption that match observations of the real economy.
In contrast to this viewpoint, a behavioral interpretation of the business cycle posits that changes in economic fundamentals,
alone, are are insufficient to explain macroeconomic fluctuations. This viewpoint is perhaps best summarized by President Franklin
Roosevelt’s famous remark the midst of the great depression, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself”. In economics, this
perspective is associated with a number of terms; Keynes’s famous “animal spirits”, but also the close related ideas of economic
sunspots and indeterminacy. While these notions differ somewhat from one another in their details, they all suggest that subjective
psychological factors such as fear and uncertainty also govern macroeconomic activity. Further, while it’s unclear how many
contemporary macroeconomists take such ideas seriously, a behavioral interpretation of recessions is very prevalent among laymen
and policy makers, and is widely reported in the mass media.1
Distinguishing between these two viewpoints is not only a matter of understanding the fundamental origins of the business
cycle. It also significantly affects the way we look at government intervention. In an world governed by efficient reactions to
shifting economic fundamentals, government intervention is limited to manipulation of markets through real, bottom-line effects.
A tax break increases consumer’s disposable income, stimulating aggregate demand. A change in the money supply increases
real wealth because prices are sticky. In both of these cases, it’s the government’s physical impact on a market, facilitated by
real economic transactions, which alters the course of the slumping economy. But in a world where fear itself is contractionary,
government policy with regards to the economy needs to be marketed, since agent’s subjective beliefs about that intervention (and
it’s effectiveness) have real economic consequences. While some politicians have clearly incorporated this idea as part of their
anti-recession strategy - with F.D.R’s fireside chats as an early example, many (including, Former treasury secretary Hank Pauson)
have argued that government intervention in the economy is poorly communicated to the public. From Alan Greenspan’s famously
cryptic reports to congress, to the widespread unpopularity of the TARP bailout despite overwhelming support among economists,
evidence of this disconnect is easy to find.
This paper seeks to test the behavioral hypothesis of business cycle fluctuations using both applied and theoretical tools. To
see how, it’s important to recognize that the behavioral hypothesis described above consists of two separate but interdependent
components. The first is the subjective attitudes of microeconomic agents with regards to the economy and their expectations
of it’s future. This includes elements which are already incorporated into standard models, such as consumers’ aversion to risk.
But understanding the attitudes of individual agents isn’t enough. After all, such attitudes are never formed in a vacuum - agents
constantly receive signals from other agents, and from organized institutions such as the government and the mass media. To
understand the behavioral component to the business cycle, we must also think about the social mechanisms which govern how
individual attitudes are formed and how they spread throughout the economy.
The empirical paper which forms the first part of this dissertation looks primarily at the social component - specifically, the
role the mass media played in the past two recessions. The theoretical paper in the subsequent chapter focuses on the individual
component - specifically, the effects of risk aversion of the side of firms. But whatever the mechanism, these papers have one thing
in common: they show that “real” economic factors don’t entirely determine the economy’s reaction to a shock; that something
psychological or sociological is also implicated.
1See the appendix and the introduction of Chapter 1 for more evidence of this.
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Part I
The Labor Market Effects of Bad Economic News
1 Introduction
This paper asks whether the mass media can amplify business cycle fluctuations. Consider the following scenario: a consumer reads
an article in a major U.S. newspaper warning of an oncoming economic downturn. Uncertain about the future, and worried about
her job security, she postpones buying a new car until the next year. At a local car dealership, a sales manager reads the same article.
Now pessimistic about consumer demand, he delays the planned hiring of new workers. In taking these actions, both agents have
made it more likely that the very recession they fear will come to pass. If many agents across society respond in a similar matter,
the economy may begin to sputter - exactly as the article warned.
The remainder of this paper will refer to the above tale as the media-feedback hypothesis. Is such a scenario really possible?
While forms of this story are often discussed by policy-makers and the public, the effects of media sentiment on business cycle
outcomes is poorly understood. A robust literature within political science has established that the news plays a pivotal role in
informing the public about economic conditions (Goidel et. al., 2010). But does the news media’s coverage of events merely reflect
economic reality, or does it help shape that reality? If the media does exert a causal role, how large is it’s influence?
Previous research hints that these questions are more than speculative. Numerous studies have found that the news affects peo-
ple’s attitudes towards the state of the economy, even after controlling for one’s personal economic situation (Fogarty, 2005; Goidel
& Langley, 1995). What’s more, both applied and theoretical papers have suggested that such attitudes may affect macroeconomic
preformance (Matsuska & Sbordone, 1995; Ludvigson, 2004; Taylor, 2007). Taken together, this evidence implies that the news
may play an independent role in shaping economic outcomes.
However, no papers have yet tried to directly estimate the effects of media pessimism on economic performance. Any attempt
to preform such an estimation must overcome the challenge of simultaneity - since the media is obligated to report on economic
events, it’s difficult to differentiate between negative news causing outcomes and negative outcomes causing the news. This issue is
exacerbated by the fact that the media’s voice has only been characterized at aggregate levels - for example, counting the number of
times the word “recession” appears across major news sources. While such measures are almost always correlated with GDP, it’s
difficult to control for the presence of unobserved confounds when time is the only source of identifying variation. To address these
limitations, this paper constructs a unique panel dataset describing the delivery of pessimistic economic news at county and quarter
levels. It also preforms content analysis of that news in order to identify and remove stories which merely report local economic
conditions. As I’ll argue in greater detail, these innovations help us to identify the media’s causal effect.
But before delving into this paper’s methodology, I want to emphasize why economists should care about the media’s role at all
- particularly macroeconomists. The feedback of pessimistic information is frequently described in the public discourse as playing a
causal role in business cycle contraction. For example, consider the following statement made by Warren Buffet to the shareholders
of Berkshire Hathaway in the midst of the recent financial crisis:
“By the fourth quarter, the credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices, had produced a paralyzing
fear that engulfed the country. A free-fall in business activity ensued, accelerating at a pace that I have never before
witnessed. The U.S. – and much of the world – became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback cycle. Fear led to
business contraction, and that in turn led to even greater fear.” [Emphasis mine]
Business leaders and policy-makers often express similar sentiments; the appendix cites a range of voices, including Federal Re-
serve chairman Ben Bernanke and president Barack Obama, all echoing Buffet’s statements. But despite their popularity, such
explanations are usually not invoked in standard business cycle models, which instead view recession as an efficient response to
fluctuations in economic fundamentals (Tayler & Woodfood, 1999). While effects consistent with Buffet’s account can appear in cer-
tain parametrizations of these models, such “sunspot equilibria” are generally considered to be pathological (Farmer, 1999). These
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Figure 1: Pessimistic Articles per Person - 2nd Quarter, 2008
competing explanations represent two fundamentally different notions of business cycle dynamics; it’s important that economists
can distinguish between them on the basis of empirical evidence.
How does the media’s effect bear on this issue? Since the news media is the public’s primary source of economic information,
it almost certainly plays a pivotal role in the type of feedback cycle described by Buffet above. In essence, the scenario in the first
paragraph of this paper is simply an instance of Buffet’s claim, with pessimistic news catalyzing the type of fear-driven cycle he
describes. Detecting an independent effect of media pessimism would imply that Buffet’s theory, and similar accounts of business
cycle dynamics, deserve to be taken more seriously.
What’s more, role of the media has implications for public policy, since government action during a recession is widely re-
ported by the news. Traditional views of fiscal stimulus emphasize the effects of government spending on aggregate demand. But
Konstantinou & Tagkalakis (2009) find evidence that such interventions also affect consumer and business confidence. It may
be that government policy has a stimulatory effect through this channel, even if the direct intervention fails to have the intended
consequences.
A Natural Experiment This paper will estimate the media’s influence by exploiting idiosyncrasies in the way that news is deliv-
ered across the United States. To see how, consider the following thought experiment. Take a number of counties in the U.S. that
are facing identical economic conditions. Now imagine censoring the flow of news into each county. Some counties will be fed
entirely optimistic news, others counties pessimistic news, still others neutral coverage or a blend of positive and negative voices.
After a while, we will observe how relevant economic variables such as hiring or employment have changed in these counties. Since
the counties differ only in the news that they received, such an experiment would allow us to identify the causal effect of media
pessimism on economic outcomes.
While this procedure is obviously infeasible, this paper argues that nature has already conducted a version of this experiment
for us. Figure 1 displays the distribution of economically pessimistic newspaper articles per person delivered to counties across the
U.S. in the second quarter of 2008. This unique dataset was built by combining data on newspaper subscribership with a count of the
number of pessimistic articles printed by each those papers; it is the first time that the flow of pessimistic economic news has been
understood at sub-national resolution. The great variation in the level of media-pessimism between counties exists for two reasons.
First, different counties rely on different newspapers; second, those papers vary in pessimism between one another and over time.
By carefully examining the relationship between this pattern of pessimism and labor market conditions in each county, the causal
effect of media sentiment can be inferred.
The success of this procedure relies on overcoming two important confounds. First, unobserved variables may jointly affect
media-pessimism and economic performance. For example, suppose that the New York Times is relatively more optimistic than
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other sources of news. Suppose further that managers who read the New York Times tend to be more optimistic, and thus, more
likely to hire a worker. We would then expect to see a positive correlation between counties receiving optimistic news and counties
with more hiring. This correlation would be driven by differential reliance on the New York Times as a news source rather than a
causal relationship between optimism and hiring.
Second, the very notion of feedback implies that media pessimism is both a cause and a result of poor economic performance.
This simultaneity complicates our estimation procedure. For example, suppose a factory in a given county shuts down, and that this
event is covered by a widely read local newspaper. That county would then receive a positive shock to both unemployment and the
level of pessimistic news. However, this correlation would result from a bad economy causing bad news, not the reserve.
The panel data-set constructed in this paper can help overcome both of these difficulties. As we’ll see, the empirical results
below are robust to county and state-by-year fixed effects as well as a battery of demographic controls. In section 3.4, I will argue
that the most important classes of unobserved heterogeneity can be absorbed by these covariates. At the same time, this paper
introduces a number of innovations to deal with simultaneity. The most important of these involves textual analysis of the articles
themselves to identify and remove stories which refer to local employment conditions. This will allow us to see whether differential
exposure to news about the state of the national economy can affect local outcomes. Since any single county has only a marginal
effect on the national economic state, this analysis would reflect the effect of news on outcomes, not the vice-versa.2
Summary of Findings Before describing my estimation procedure in detail, I will summarize the most important findings of
this paper. The first result is hinted at by figure 1; the spatial distribution of pessimistic news, which until now has never been
characterized, is extremely heterogeneous. During the height of the past recession, media pessimism varies by several orders of
magnitude between counties in the same quarter. This cross sectional variation is most prominent at small geographic scales, and
it’s variance dwarfs the dispersion of underlying economic variables such as unemployment or output. In both time and space, the
signals that agents receive about the economy fluctuate far more wildly than its actual state.
Second, the causal effect of pessimistic news on county employment rates was estimated at roughly 0.2 percentage points per
article per person. This estimate would amount to a reduction in employment of roughly 600,000 jobs from 2007 to 2010, or some
7% of the total change in employment over those three years. The effect of the media was particular pronounced in the early stages
of the recession, where it can account for up to 40% of the reduction in employment in a given quarter. Additional analysis of
Google search data shows that the flow of pessimistic news into a county increases the number of google searches for the word
“recession” in that county. This suggests that the labor market effects described above are mediated by changes in public sentiment
resulting from exposure to pessimistic news.
Third, the media’s effect on total employment is mostly driven by it’s effect on job creation. The point estimates for hiring
are negative and precisely estimated across all specifications, while the effect on separations is ambiguous in sign and tends to be
statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with recent theoretical and empirical studies that highlight the importance of job-
finding as the primary driver of countercyclical employment patterns (Shimer, 2007). It also argues that simultaneity isn’t driving
our estimates, as layoffs are far more newsworthy than simply a suppression of hiring.
Forth, the causal of effect of pessimism appears to vary significantly across industries. Construction, retail trade, and finance
are among the industries most sensitive to pessimistic news, while agriculture, entertainment, and health care show the smallest
response. The sensitivity of an industry to media pessimism appears to be uncorrelated with that industry’s level of newsworthiness,
but positively correlated with the contraction in output experienced by that industry during the recession. This also suggests that the
effect is caused by industries cutting employment in anticipation of a reduced demand, rather than the mere reporting of poor labor
market conditions.
Finally, there is evidence of media saturation - once it becomes widely known that a recession is in progress, pessimistic news
is no longer a significant driver of labor market outcomes. For example, bad news has a strong negative impact on employment and
2Of course, there are caveats to this line of thought which need to be dealt with individually. I will be discussing these issues in detail in the identification section
below.
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hiring during the first year of the recession. Subsequently, the effect becomes weaker, less significant, and in fact is slightly positive
for some specifications.
Together, these results bear on more general questions regarding the business cycle and how it should be understood. The discus-
sion section addresses the relationship between the empirical findings above and macroeconomic theory. In particular, it describes
the connection between media-feedback, sunspot equilibria, and “animal spirits”, and asks whether it’s possible to reconcile the
presence of a media effect with the assumption of rational expectations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section one reviews the existing literature and describes some of the
common difficulties in identifying the effects of sentiment - either on the part of the media, or consumers and business owners.
Section three describes my empirical methodology with a focus on addressing these identification problems. Section four presents
my results in detail, and section five discusses the relationship between these results and macroeconomic theory.
2 Previous Literature
As yet, no papers have tried to directly estimate the effects of media pessimism on economic performance. However, the existing
literature, if taken as a whole, suggests that attitudes in the news may affect the course of the business cycle. This research falls
into two categories. First, a robust line of research in the political science literature documents the effects of media pessimism on
consumers attitudes. These papers have established that individuals rely on the mass media for economic information (De Boef
& Kellstedt, 2004; Wu et. al, 2002; Hetherington, 1996; among many others), that citizens pay more attention to economic news
during a recession (Soroka, 2006; Hester & Gibson, 2003; Headrick & Lanoue, 1991, Doms & Morin, 2004), and that the news has
an independent effect on sentiment even after controlling for real economic conditions (Goeidel et al., 2010, Fogarty, 2005; Goidel
& Langley, 1995; Harrington, 1989).
As an exemplar of the methods employed in these papers, consider Geoidel et al., 2010. In this paper, the authors analyze the
effects of TV and print media on consumer sentiment in Louisiana. They use data from the Louisiana Consumer Confidence Survey;
critically, this survey contains questions not only about consumer’s economic attitudes, but their exposure to economic news in both
TV and newspapers. They subsequently measure the pessimism of popular news sources in Louisiana (both on TV and in print) by
hiring students to manually watch or read samples from those sources. They find that exposure to pessimistic news on television
has a significant impact on individual’s expectations of personal and family finances, while exposure to bad news in the newspaper
seems to impact their assessment of U.S. business conditions. Importantly, these results hold after controlling for each individual’s
demographic characteristics and personal economic situation.
In a related paper, Haller and Norpoth (1997) find that close to half of Americans self-report no economic news exposure, but that
their expectations generally track respondents with positive exposure. This suggests that the attitude of the media is subsequently
transmitted by word-of-mouth or other channels of communication, and may have an impact beyond the immediate watchers or
readers of that news.3
Within the political science literature, a clear consensus have developed that the media has an effect on individual’s economic
sentiments. But do those changes in sentiment translate to changes in macroeconomic conditions? This question is the subject of
a number of papers within economics, and is more controversial. These papers can be divided into three categories: first, surveys
at the micro-level which establish a relationship between confidence and the behavior of individual firms or consumers (Silverstone
& Mitchell, 1995); second, theory papers which attempt to endogenize business or consumer confidence into business cycle models
(Danthine et. al, 1998; Fagiolo & Roventini, 2004; Sell, 2005), and third, empirical papers which directly estimate the effects of
consumer or producer sentiment on economic outcomes.
This third line of papers is most similar to my research, and has been the subject of considerable debate. Much of this literature
tries to relate measures of public attitude (such as University of Michigan’s consumer confidence index) with macroeconomic
3To be fair, the correlation between news watchers and non-watchers could also be explained third factors which jointly determine media coverage and general
public attitude. This type of issue isn’t fully addressed in the Haller and Norpoth paper, but will be addressed in this paper.
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variables such as spending or output, usually through a vector-autoregression. The idea is to see if consumer confidence can predict
future changes in the target macroeconomic variable after other factors influencing that variable (say, stock market performance
or housing prices) are included in the specification. Some of these papers find a positive effect of consumer confidence on output
(Matsuska & Sbordone 1995, Golinelli & Parigi 2004, Hall, 1993) but others find that the effect disappears if additional covariates
are taken into account (Desroches et al., 2002, Loria and Brito, 2004, Adams & Green, 1965). This disagreement highlights an
important limitation of using nationally aggregated measures of consumer attitude - with identifying variation provided by time
alone, it’s always difficult to establish whether pessimism is causing poor economic performance, or whether an omitted factor is
jointly affecting both.
This paper differs from the line of research above in two significant ways. First, it focuses on the attitude of the media rather
than the attitude of individuals. The literature cited above has shown a clear relationship between media sentiment and consumer
sentiment, but the former can be measured without the use of subjective surveys. More importantly, while measures of consumer
confidence are only available as a national time series, this paper disaggregates media sentiment by county. With panel data in
hand, the introduction of fixed effects can control for many kinds of potential confounds at once. As we’ll see below, the effects of
media-pessimism can be identified using only variation between counties in the same state and quarter.
Lastly, the paper most similar in methodology to this one is Engelberg & Parsons (Journal of Finance, 2011). Here the authors
are interested in the effects of the media on financial markets. They find that local trading is strongly related to the local reporting
of industry specific news, and that regional idiosyncrasies in media coverage (for example, weather events that affect newspaper
delivery) affect trading in those areas. My paper also uses regional variation in news delivery for identifying variation - albeit of a
different type - but it focuses on macroeconomic performance rather than stock market activity. In addition, it analyzes data from
nearly all U.S. counties and newspapers, rather than a subset of urban areas and corresponding local papers.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Measuring the Delivery of Bad Economic News
This paper’s methodology begins with measuring the delivery of pessimistic news across the United States at high resolution. Due
to data availability, I focus on the newspaper medium rather than television, radio or internet news sources. While newspapers have
experienced declining readership in the past decade, Gallop’s annual survey of the news media (Figure 2) reveals that roughly 31%
of individuals still report getting yesterday’s news from the paper - this compares with 34% for radio and 58% for television news .
As discussed in the literature review, Goeidel et. al find that newspapers actually have a stronger impact on individual’s assessment
of the U.S. business climate than television news. Given this, it seems safe to assume that newspapers have a significant, albeit
declining role in shaping the public’s economic sentiment.
To date, newspaper’s attitudes with respect to the economy have only been characterized on limited scale. For example, Alsem
(2008) uses human readers to count the number of pessimistic articles appearing in major dutch newspapers between 1998 and
2002. There are two limitations with this kind of measure. First, relying on manual reading means that only a small number of dates
and papers can be surveyed - the dutch study included only two major papers and used only articles appearing on the first Saturday
of each month. More significantly, this approach doesn’t take into account geographic dispersion in newspaper readership. With
the exception of a few nationally distributed sources, U.S. papers are highly regional in nature with many publications possessing
subscribership in only a few counties. This means that characterizing the pessimism of any single source is only informative of the
news delivered to a small region.
The scope of this analysis is considerably broader. By using an automatic search, I identify pessimistic articles across almost
every U.S. newspaper for all dates in the past two decades. I then combine this measure with geographic data on newspaper
subscribership; the result is a quarterly reconstruction of the flow of negative articles into each U.S. county. The next three sections
describe the details of this process, beginning with how the pessimism of a given newspaper was established.
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Figure 2: Gallop Poll (2010) - Relative Popularity of Various Media Types
How pessimistic was each newspaper in a given period? U.S. newspaper articles with a negative economic outlook were identi-
fied using an “indexed search” in the Lexis-Nexis Academic database. Lexis-Nexis catalogs the full text of almost all U.S. newspa-
pers and scores each newspaper article on a scale of 1 to 100 for a number of topics, such as “economic decline”, “unemployment”,
“local and regional”, or “United States”. After experimenting with combinations of these terms, search criterion were found which
could consistently identify pessimistic articles. Importantly, it was possible to ignore optimistic articles by avoiding stories tagged
with “economic growth” or “economic recovery”.
This process identified some 67,000 economically pessimistic articles across 716 newspapers over the past two decades. Of
these sources, roughly one-fifth (151 newspapers) reported more than one-hundred pessimistic articles over the entire time-frame.
These 151 major sources account for more than 85% of the total volume of pessimistic stories. Figure 3 displays how these stories
are distributed in time, both for all U.S. newspapers and for the five sources reporting the greatest number of stories. It’s clear from
this data that the volume of media pessimism closely tracks the course of the business cycle. It’s also clear that there is significant
variation in the level of pessimism between sources, both in terms of the average number of stories reported and the timing of those
stories.4 These trends are consistent with previous studies which have found that the volume of pessimistic news is anticyclical.
Figure 3: Pessimistic Newspaper Articles Per Quarter
4The previous two recessions are easy to identify in this figure; the early 90’s contraction is also barely visible. Lexis-Nexis data is incomplete for some
newspapers before 1991, therefore, this third recession is appears less prominently
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What do these articles talk about? Table 1 displays the most frequently used words in the identified articles. The topic of
these stories ranges widely. Some refer to specific economic indicators or events, such as the BEA’s quarterly GDP estimate or the
collapse of Lehman Brother holdings. Most articles don’t explicitly refer to economic indicators, but instead describe how declining
economic conditions are affecting individuals or institutions, and how those individuals or instruction are coping with the changes.
A minority refer to local layoffs or plant closings - as will be discussed later, these articles pose problem with our identification
strategy and will be eliminated from the sample.
Common Words in Identified Articles
Rank Count Word Rank Count Word
1 4070 economy 11 1448 sales
2 3138 state 12 1341 plan
3 2990 new 13 1300 market
4 2347 business 14 1239 recession
5 2336 economic 15 1238 cut
6 2293 budget 16 1213 year
7 1878 tax 17 1206 county
8 1715 cuts 18 1174 area
9 1697 jobs 19 1155 rate
10 1455 city 20 1132 job
Table 1: Frequent words in identified articles, excluding common english words.
Who reads what newspapers? County level data on newspaper subscribership was obtained from the Alliance for Audited
Media. The AAM is a non-profit organization that collects subscribership data for print media sources and sells this information
to advertisers and academics, not unlike the ratings data collected by Neilsons for television programming. For each U.S. county,
this dataset breaks down the number of subscribers by newspaper for all papers with more than fifty subscribers in the county.
Subscription to each news source is further disaggregated by edition - for example, Saturday, Sunday, and weekday subscriptions
are separately counted. Data was available for the years 2006, 2009, and 2012. Subscribership for the years between these dates, as
well as dates going back to the year 2003 was extrapolated using a linear interpolation. Other interpolation schemes were tested for
this purpose, however, no significant differences were found the subsequent empirics. Including only dates subsequent to 2006 was
also tested, again with no significant difference in results.
An additional caveat involves subscribership data for three major newspapers: the New York Times, USA Today, and the Wall
Street Journal. The AAM considers these sources to be “national papers” and collects subscribership data for these papers annually
at the DMA level. A DMA refers to a “designated market area”, a set of standardized regions frequently used by advertisers.
Each DMA is comprised of a large number of zip-codes; there are roughly two hundred such regions in the US, with each region
corresponding roughly to 15 counties. County level subscribership for the DMAs was interpolated by using each county’s population
share within that DMA.
Figure 4 summarizes the subscriptions information contained in the AAM dataset. Overall, newspaper circulation size is dis-
tributed exponentially with a median of subscribership of roughly 37,000. While the three papers mentioned above are circulated
nationally, these papers are a glaring exception in a landscape of otherwise highly local publications. Of the more than one thousand
sources tracked by the AAM, only twelve have positive circulation in more than a hundred counties. In fact, the majority of papers
have a readership which extends for only a handful counties and may have as few as several thousand readers. This patchwork
of regional papers, all reporting a differing levels of negative news, is what creates the great geographic dispersion in pessimism
displayed in figure 1.
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Figure 4: Nature of Newspaper Sources
3.2 Computing the Flow of Pessimistic News into Each County
With these data in hand, the total flow of pessimistic news into each county was computed in the following manner. First, the
newspapers listed in both the AAM and the Lexis Nexis database were cross-indexed. This process matched 70% of all sources
and 84% of all articles in the two datasets. Second, the date of each article was used to establish the edition in which that article
appeared (i.e., Saturday edition vs. weekday). Then, for each county, the number of stories in each edition-source was summed,
weighted by the number of subscribers to that edition-source. Finally, this quantity was divided by the county’s total population.
The resulting variable is called articles per person (APP) and is the primary explanatory variable considered in this paper. This
quantity represents the average number of newspaper articles delivered to a county per capita. Obviously, there is no way to tell
if every individual reads each article; if they do, this variable would represent the average number of pessimistic stories read by a
person living in a given county per quarter.
APPi,t =
1
populationit
J∑
j=1
E∑
e=1
Subscribers(i, t)j,e ∗Articles(i, t)j,e
j = 1...J Sources
e = 1...E Editions
i = 1...N Counties
t = 1...T Quarters
As an example, figure 5 displays the above calculation for the state of Virginia. The top six panels maps the subscriptions rate to
the weekday edition of the most widely read newspapers in Virginia and displays the total number of pessimistic articles printed by
each of those sources. For simplicity, I’ve summed each of these sources across editions; the totals below refer to total subscribers
regardless of edition. The bottom diagram displays the flow of pessimistic news based these data, with the total count on the left
and the per-person count on the right.
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USA Today - 28 Articles Washington Post - 71 Articles
New York Times - 79 Articles Virginia-Pilot - 50 Articles
Richmond Times-Dispatch - 54 Articles Roanoke Times - 10 articles
Total Pessimistic Articles Delivered Articles Per Person (APP)
Figure 5: Constructing a Measure of Media-Pessimism
3.3 Jobs Data
Detailed data on employment, hiring, and separations was acquired from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) released by the
U.S. Census Bureau. Labor market behavior was chosen as the outcome of interest in this paper for several reasons. First, detailed
data about the labor market is available at county and quarterly frequencies. Most measures of consumer behavior such as personal
savings are reported only annually or as a national aggregate. Second, some properties of the labor market can aid identification.
For example, the relative strength of the effect on hiring as compared to separations can help distinguish between the news causing
outcomes and outcomes causing the news; this will be discussed during the next section.
The use of employment data as an outcome variable might raise several concerns. First, we might be worried that only a small
fraction of the individuals exposed to pessimistic news are in a position to make hiring or firing decisions. Second, we might be
worried that business owners do not live (and therefore, do not subscribe to the news) in the same county in which their business
resides. If a given county receives a shock of bad news, but all readers in that county own businesses in an adjacent county (leading
to job losses only in the adjacent county), we would have trouble identifying the relationship between the two.
Thankfully, neither of these concerns are serious. For one, although business owners might sometimes commute to another
county for work, there’s no reason to believe that this effect is systematically related to our explanatory variables. Moreover, both
concerns apply less to small businesses. For smaller firms, we would expect a relatively higher fraction of individuals to participate
in the hiring and firing process. We would also expect higher correlation between where decision makers live and where they work.
98% of all business in the U.S. have less than one hundred employees and these firms account for a quarter of all employment; it’s
likely that any employment effect we observe is disproportionately driven by these businesses.
Other Data Annual county-level data on population and demographics were collected from the National Cancer Institute, while
information on education attainment was obtained from the FDA. Annual county level household incomes were obtained from the
BEA; unfortunately, no measures of GDP are available at this level. Finally, data on internet searches for the word “recession”, to
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be used in the discussion section, were obtained through Google Trends.
3.4 Identification
Having constructed a county-level measure of pessimistic news, we turn to estimating the causal effect of that news on macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Let’s begin by considering an simple OLS regression of APP on a measure of labor market performance, say, total
employment rates:
Jobsit = c+ βAPPit + γXit + εit (1)
Here, APPit is the articles per person measure constructed above, Xit is a vector of observed covariates, and Jobsit represents
the labor market variable of interest. Beta is the parameter to be estimated, and as usual, any variation in Jobsit unexplained by
our observables is represented in the error term εit. As with all OLS specifications, correlation between articles per person and this
error will bias our estimates. This could occur if we omit a variable correlated with both APP and employment, or if APP itself is
correlated with employment.
To gauge the likelihood of either form of endogeneity, it’s useful to express APP as the product of three separate components.
To see how, note that APP is defined as follows:5
APPit =
1
Populationit

 ∑
j sources
(Subscribersj,it) (Articlesj,t)


We rewrite this expression by factoring the total number of subscribers in each county out of the sum:
APPit =
Subcribersit
Populationit
∑
j sources
(
Subscribersj,it
Subcribersit
)
(Articlesj,t)
= (PenRateit)
∑
j sources
(SubSharej,it) (Articlesj,t) (2)
I’ll frequently be referring to these three components, so let me describe each in turn. The term on the left represents the total
number of subscriptions to any newspaper divided by the county’s population; I call this quantity the newspaper penetration rate.
Since an individual can subscribe to multiple papers, or multiple editions of the same paper, this figure is an upper bound for the
percentage of people in a county who subscribe to any newspaper at all.
The second term, SubSharej,it, describes the share of a given newspaper in the total number of subscriptions; in other words,
it represents the relative popularity of each source. For counties in which only one newspaper sees significant circulation (roughly
35% of counties in my sample), this term is equal to one.
The last term, Articlesj,t, describes the number of articles printed by each newspaper in a given quarter. Notice that this
variable lacks an “i” subscript, this reflects the fact that newspapers do not print different editions of their paper for different
counties. However, because many of the newspapers in my sample are highly local, the j and i index are highly confounded. For
example, it’s likely that the number of pessimistic articles printed by the Omaha World-Herald is highly sensitive to economic
conditions in a few particular counties, namely, the counties near Omaha, Nebraska. In contrast, a nationally read newspaper such
as the New York Times is less likely to be sensitive to employment conditions in any particular region6. It’s the relationship between
local coverage and local conditions which most threatens our estimation procedure.
In many of the empirical specifications below, I also refer to a related measure: the number of articles per reader (APR). This
quantity divides the total flow of articles by the number of subscribers rather than the county’s population. APR more closely
5For simplicity, I omit the summation over editions of the same paper; all of the arguments below still hold with this change.
6Although even in this case, we would expect the N.Y. Times to be more sensitive events in New York
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Newspaper Penetration
Rate
Relative Popularity of
Sources
Articles Per Source
Simultaneity Local unemployment is
negatively correlated
with total subscriptions,
probably due to savings
behavior.
Unlikely that
unemployment itself
significantly shifts
relative popularity of
sources.
Since newspapers are
highly regional, local
unemployment patterns
are positively correlated
with pessimistic articles.
Omitted Variables Factors such as
population density or
demographics might
jointly affect newspaper
penetration and
employment.
Factors such as political
alignment or education
may jointly affect the
relative popularity of
various newspapers and
employment.
Any other economic
factor, say, stock market
performance, might
jointly affect
newspapers’ coverage
and employment.
Table 2: Summary of possible identification issues
resembles the actual number of articles an individual reader will encounter, but doesn’t take into account the share of those readers
in the total population.
APRit =
1
Subscribersit

 ∑
j sources
(Subscribersj,it) (Articlesj,t)


APRit =
∑
j sources
(SubSharej,it) (Articlesj,t)
If APR is decomposed in the same way as APP above, the result will lack the newspaper penetration term. We will use APR
when we are concerned that omitted variables might jointly affect bulk subscribership to newspapers (for example, urban areas
might have more jobs and more subscribers), but not the relative popularity of each source.
The key to our identification is that we will deal piece-wise with each of the three terms in equation 2. If any term is correlated
with our error, due to either simultaneity through an omitted variable, we will introduce a solution for that term. After all of these
treatments, none of these three components will co-vary with the error and their product APP will be exogenous as well.
Table 2 summarizes the problems facing each term by giving an example of why that term might be endogenous. For example,
column two indicates that while employment is unlikely to be related to the relative popularity of different newspapers directly,
the two may be jointly determined by the political alignment of a given county. Perhaps liberal counties read more optimistic
newspapers and are also more willing to hire. This table is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all possible confounding factors,
but rather, gives an example of the kinds of variables which need concern us. The remainder of this section will explain how to deal
with each cell in this table.
3.4.1 Dealing with Simultaneity
Since the very notion of media-feedback implies both backward and forward causation, simultaneity posses an identification chal-
lenge. How do we distinguish between the news causing outcomes and outcomes causing the news? The answer is to focus on the
kinds of news stories which are unlikely to be generated by local employment events. For example, consider the following set of
headlines:
“County jobless rate inches up: discouraged workers’ re-entering the work force could account for the slight rise to
10.9 percent”
“Shortfall expected by city yet again: the discrepancy could be $35 million. Leaders vow to save services and jobs”
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“Brunswick to close four plants, cut 2,700 jobs to save $300 mil.; economic downturn cited in heavy reductions”
Contrast these with the following:
“Bush ousts treasury secretary, adviser; slack economy key factor”
“Economy Shrinks With Consumers Leading the Way”
“Fed chief spreads gloom; stocks boomerang downward after Bernanke predicts greater slowdown”
All of these headlines are taken from the set of newspaper articles used to construct the APP measure. The former set suffers from
the simultaneity problem, these articles are obviously generated by local employment conditions. The second set, though, refers
to broad economic events which affect the whole county and are less to be linked with job losses in any particular locale.The idea
that pessimistic national news should affect local economic conditions without being affected by those conditions the key to our
identification strategy.7
Looking at equation 2, though, we see that simultaneity will be a problem if Jobsit co-varies with any of the terms entering into
APP. The issue discussed in the last paragraph deals with the final component of this expression, the number of articles printed by a
given source in a given quarter.
APPit = (PenRateit)
∑
j sources
(SubSharej,it) (Articlesj,t)
Do the first two terms pose a problem? For the second term, the answer is no. There’s no reason to believe that changes in
employment conditions will shift the relative popularity of each news source. As for the first term, Jobsit and the newspaper
penetration rate do co-vary, but the sign of this relationship favors our estimation. To see why, note that employment should
affect newspaper penetration, but not vice-versa; therefore, an appropriately controlled OLS regression should identify the effect of
employment on newspaper penetration. Table 21 (appendix) shows such an estimation; here, the effect of employment is regressed
on newspaper penetration with county, state-by-quarter fixed effects, and a number of demographic controls are imposed. We find
that employment has a positive effect on penetration, likely due the to the income effect. This means that all else being equal,
counties experiencing more unemployment receive less bad news. If we nonetheless find a negative effect of news on employment,
this finding would be an underestimate. Alternatively, articles per reader can be used instead of articles per person, eliminating the
relevance of newspaper penetration entirely.
Turning back to the relationship between local employment and the volume of articles (the third term), I’ve argued that stories
pertaining to national economic conditions are less likely to be related to Jobsit. I now describe how to identify such articles in the
set of pessimistic stories.
Identifying “Simultaneous” Articles The Lexis-Nexis dataset includes a number of predefined keywords and corresponding
relevancy scores which assess the topic of an article. Unfortunately, not all articles have relevancy tags (this is related to when the
article was entered into the Lexis Nexis system), and what’s more, Lexis-Nexis only reports the top three tags. For example, if
an article is tagged as “petroleum (95%)”, “energy independence (90%)”, and “recession (85%)”, the tag “layoffs (80%)” will be
omitted even though it’s relevancy score is high. Nonetheless, these keywords represent a good starting point - being tagged with
either “layoffs” or “local & regional” in the dataset is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for that article being problematic.
Textual analysis was then preformed to identify problematic articles in the remaining stories. First, a word count was preformed
on the titles of all articles tagged with “layoffs”. The forty most commonly used words in this set of articles was identified, and
number of times each of these words appears in all articles was counted. Then, a probit was run to assess how the appearance of
7Of course, the overall economic condition of the U.S. is the average of countless local conditions; however, the impact of any single county on the whole is very
marginal. There are rare instances in which the condition of a particular county might be considered exceptionally representative of the U.S. as a whole, either for
economic reasons - as in the case of New York City, or for symbolic reasons, as in the case of Detroit. However, we can get around this issue by simply excluding
these areas from our analysis, either one-by-one, or by excluding all urban areas. The later is done in the results section.
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each of these forty words affect the likelihood that an article was tagged with “layoffs”. Then, the probability that any article should
have been tagged with “layoffs” was computed, based the words appearing in that story’s title and the probit scores associated with
those words. This process was repeated for articles tagged with “regional & local”. Finally, articles all rated with a tag-probability
above the 75th percentile for either “layoffs” or “local & regional” were dropped from the count of pessimistic articles. The analysis
was repeated using the 60th and 90th percentile with little change in the subsequent empirics.
Using Only National Papers One could argue that the above procedure is only a partial solution. This is because newspapers’
coverage of even the national economy may be affected by regional conditions. For example, suppose that local layoffs make local
reporters more aware of the deteriorating state of the entire economy. We would expect these reporters to begin writing more stories
about the national economy, once again causing simultaneity between Jobsit and the article-count.
To deal with this issue, I can use articles only from newspapers with national circulation to construct the APP measure. The
New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and USA Today are the three papers in my sample which are circulated nationally. Since
these publications report on conditions across the United States, they are unlikely to suffer from the problem above; we wouldn’t
expect N.Y. Times reporters to begin noticing a downturn only after layoffs in a particular locale. The only exceptions to this line
of reasoning are the home bases of each paper itself (New York City for the Times and the WSJ, Washington D.C. for USA Today),
and areas considered particularly symbolic of the nation’s economic condition such as Detroit or Silicon Valley. These areas can
simply be excluded from the regression; in fact, table 19 in the results section deals with this problem by dropping all urban areas
from the specification.
Figure 6: Dealing with simultaneity. APP computed using all articles and newspapers (top), compared with using filtered articles
and national newspapers only (bottom).
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Details about the estimates In addition, important details of the estimates suggest that simultaneity isn’t a major problem. First,
in almost all specifications, hiring shows a greater and more precisely estimated effect than separations. If our results were driven
by the media reporting on employment conditions, the opposite would be true, since layoffs generate more bad press than a firm
simply not hiring workers. Similarly, we can estimate the effects of APP on job losses in particular industries; if our results are
driven by simultaneity, we would expect a correlation between the estimated size of the media effect and the newsworthiness of an
industry. Both of these comparisons will be discussed in the results section below.
3.4.2 Dealing with Omitted Variables
Unobserved factors co-varying with both APPit and labor market conditions will bias our estimation. Since so many variables
could conceivably meet this criterion, dealing with this problem has been a major stumbling block of previous research. The table
below displays the correlation of four measures of media pessimism with a number of county-level traits. There are two things
to learn from this table. First, all of our measures of media pessimism are somewhat correlated observables, such as education or
population density. Second, the per-reader measures are significantly less correlated than their per-person counterparts, implying
that much of the correlation between media-pessimism and these observables is driven by the newspaper penetration rate.
To address these issues, we introduce county, quarter, and state-by-quarter fixed effects into our specification. Though the use
of fixed effects is extremely commonplace in panel data analysis, I argue this technique is particularly helpful in our case because
of the way APP is constructed. To see why, we note that the error term in equation 1 contains county-specific and quarter-specific
components. For example, θi might represent a geographic variable which is absent in our model. This variable would affect
employment, but it’s effect is constant over time for any given county.
Jobsit = c+ βAPRit + γXit + θi + θt + θi,t
Recall that articles per person can be written as the product of three components: the newspaper penetration rate, the relative
popularity of each source, and the number of pessimistic articles per source:
APPit = (PenRateit)
∑
j sources
(SubSharej,it) (Articlesj,t)
It’s likely that the penetration rate, is largely determined by county level trails θi. The average deviation of this variable from
it’s across-time mean in each county is only 4%, while the mean deviation between counties in the same period is over 13%. This
suggests that the variation in penetration is largely cross-sectional in nature. To the extent that this is true, county-level fixed effects
will control for endogeneity though this term. Alternatively, we can use the article per reader measure, which simply does away
with this first term altogether.
Similarly, the number of articles printed by each source is likely to covary only with quarterly variables, especially after eliminat-
ing articles referring to local conditions and using only national newspapers. After all, there’s no reason believe why an unobserved
trait particular to any given county should affect the number of stories printed by the N.Y. Times about national economic conditions.
Single Source Counties The term in the middle, the relative popularity of various sources, is the most problematic. We might
expect this term to be determined by various demographic, political, or socioeconomic factors in each county. It’s possible that in
most areas, these variables change slowly enough to be absorbed by the county fixed effects; however, there’s always the chance
that a rapidly changing trait relevant to employment could also shift the popularity of a particular paper.
To mitigate this issue, it’s possible to run our regression on counties which are dominated by a single news source. In such single
source counties, the middle term in our definition of APP reduces to one.
J = 1 ⇒ APPit = (PenRateit) (Articlesj,t)
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Table 3: Cross-correlation table
Variables Art. Per Person APP, Filtered, Natl. Art. Per Reader APR, Filtered, Natl.
Art. Per Person 1.000
APP, Filtered, Natl. 0.470 1.000
Art. Per Reader 0.745 0.346 1.000
APR, Filtered, Natl. 0.153 0.518 0.443 1.000
Employment Rate 0.176 0.337 0.047 0.121
Population 0.128 0.155 0.054 0.029
Pop. Density 0.158 0.191 0.086 0.057
Newspaper Penetration 0.251 0.263 -0.090 -0.123
Med. Income 0.224 0.212 0.094 0.042
% College 0.283 0.312 0.118 0.071
Pct. Hispanic 0.018 -0.011 0.022 -0.011
Pct. Black 0.020 0.042 0.047 0.042
Pct. White -0.031 -0.040 -0.062 -0.040
Pct. Asian 0.149 0.148 0.072 0.0340
In roughly a third of the counties of my sample, more than 85% of individuals subscribe to the same news source. In the results
section, I repeat my analysis using these counties only and find few differences from the overall pattern.
Other Checks Finally, we impose three additional checks. First, all of the empirical results to follow are robust not only to county
and quarter fixed effects, but county and state-by-quarter fixed effects. In these specifications, the effects of news on outcomes
are identified by comparing counties within the same state and quarter. A number of additional factors, say, time-varying sectoral
composition, should be taken care of in this specification. Second, I introduce a battery of demographic controls, such as income,
ethnicity, and education. These are largely aimed at the first two terms in equation 2. Third, I include interactions between sectoral
composition and national GDP. While sectoral composition itself should be absorbed by the county dummies, it could be argued
that the product of sectoral composition and output is the relevant variable. For example, a county with many construction workers
might shed more jobs in response to same contraction in output as compared to a county in which most people work in health care.
Summarizing Identification Solutions
In the preceding section, I’ve argued that by breaking APP into its component terms - the penetration rate, relative popularity, and
articles per quarter, we can understand which factors affecting media pessimism are likely to be endogenous. Each of these terms
raises somewhat different identification issues, and I’ve laid how to deal with each in turn. The following table summarizes the
identification solutions described above.
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Newspaper Penetration
Rate
Relative Popularity of
Sources
Articles Per Source
Simultaneity Correlation between
jobs and penetration rate
biases beta towards zero;
estimated parameter is
lower bound. Or, use
articles per reader.
Unlikely that
unemployment shifts
relative popularity of
news-sources.
Drop all articles
pertaining to
employment or local
conditions. Use only
articles from nationally
circulated newspapers.
Omitted Variables County and
state-by-quarter fixed
effects, demographic
controls. Use articles
per reader.
County and
state-by-quarter fixed
effects, demographic
controls. Use only
single-source counties.
County and
state-by-time fixed
effects, demographic
controls. Use only
articles from nationally
circulated papers.
Table 4: Summary of Solutions for the Identification Issues Listed in Table 2
4 Results
4.1 The Delivery of Bad Economic News over the Business Cycle
As this is the first paper to measure the flow of pessimistic economic news at sub-national levels, I will begin by characterizing
this flow in detail. These findings depict the media’s unfolding response to the economic downturn, and will set the stage for the
regression analysis that follows. Unsurprisingly, the level of pessimistic news delivered to U.S. counties is highly anti-cyclical. For
example, the median level of pessimism preceding the 2008-2010 recession was close to zero prior to the downturn, and increased
roughly twenty-five fold in the first quarter of 2008. Pessimism peaked in the first quarter of 2009, when the median county received
0.75 articles per person.
This number may seem modest, but recall that since many individuals don’t subscribe to a newspaper, the level of pessimism ex-
perienced by a given reader is significantly higher than the per capita figure. Unfortunately, with readership information aggregated
at the county level, it is only possible to know the total number of newspaper subscriptions in each county, not the total number of
subscribers. The former could overstate the later if individuals subscribe to more than one newspaper or multiple editions of a single
newspaper (weekday vs. Sunday). Nevertheless, we can use the number of articles per-subscription as a lower bound for the more
meaningful per-reader figure. By this measure, the median level of pessimism during the great recession peaked at 3.5 articles per
subscriber per quarter, or slightly more than one article per month for each reader.
Figure 7: The Media as a Signal Booster
If we compare changes in media pessimism with changes in the variable of interest, unemployment, an interesting contrast
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emerges (figure 7). First, note that that unemployment is highly seasonal; however, this quarterly fluctuation is entirely absent in
the media’s response.8 Neglecting the seasonal trend, unemployment only deviates a few percentage points from it’s mean over the
course of the recession; in contrast, the volume of pessimistic articles changes by more than an order of magnitude. In a sense then,
the media plays the role of an economic hearing aid - it removes noise by clearing away the messy seasonal trend while amplifying
volume, boosting relatively modest changes in economic fundamentals into large fluctuations in the number of articles.
Articles Per Person, Total APP, No Local/Jobs, National Papers Only
Articles Per Reader, Total APR, No Local/Jobs, National Papers Only
Unemployment
Figure 8: Cross-sectional Variation in Bad News Delivered. The top four panels depict the percent deviation from the national
mean in the second quarter of 2008 for various measures of media pessimism. All measures exhibit far greater dispersion than
employment, which typically varies by only a few percent across counties.
Cross-Sectional Variation Perhaps the media’s responsiveness to the economic downturn shouldn’t surprise us - after all, reces-
sions are highly newsworthy. What’s more unexpected is the degree of variation in media pessimism across counties during the
same quarter. Figure 8 displays the volume of pessimistic articles for each county in the second quarter of 2008, compared to the
8Note that the median employment rate displayed in this graph is only around 30%, while the employment to population ratio for the US, as reported by the BLS,
is nearly 60%. This discrepancy exists for three reasons. First, the QWI misses some forms of employment, particularly in the public sector. For example, in the year
2010, total U.S. non-farm payroll employment was measured at roughly 130,000,000, while the QWI reports only 100,000,000 employed persons for the same year.
In addition, the population figure used by the BLS is the number of individuals over age sixteen, whereas the total population regardless of age is used in the diagram
above. Finally, the median rate of employment across counties understates the national rate, since counties with large populations tend to have a higher employment
rate.
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Figure 9: Cross-sectional Distribution of Bad News Delivered. Note the power-law distribution of both APP and APR, implying
that the cross-county dispersion isn’t merely driven by differences in newspaper penetration. Also note while the distribution shifts
considerably during a recession, the variance remains pronouced.
national mean in that quarter. Various ways to measure pessimism are included; the column on the left displays the total article
count, both per person and per reader; the column on the left excludes articles about employment or local conditions and counts
only articles appearing in national papers. Note that even the delivery of national news by national papers exhibits widespread
geographic variation. All of these measures exhibit far greater dispersion than unemployment, shown on the bottom panel.
Figure 9 displays this pattern more generally by plotting the overall distribution of articles per person, both before and during the
past recession. This distribution is roughly exponential with an extremely long right tail, indicating that a small number of counties
are receiving a disproportionally pessimistic media signal. This effect is not simply due to some counties possessing a higher rate
of newspaper penetration, since the articles-per-reader measure exhibits the same pattern. Instead, it’s due to the fact that a small
number of counties happen to subscribe to the most pessimistic sources, while others hear a more balanced blend of media coverage.
Changes Over Time Figures 10 and 11 depict the evolution of media pessimism during the early stages of the recession. Figure
10 plots raw articles per person, with the level on the left and the percent difference from the previous quarter on the right, while
figure 11 repeats this analysis but filters to remove local and job related articles and uses only articles from national sources. The
take away from these pictures is that while average pessimism increases sharply over the first three quarters of the recession, the
nature of this increase is highly non-uniform. This is particularly true when using only data from national papers, as idiosyncrasies
in subscription to such papers ensure that certain regions receive large shocks of pessimistic news while nearby regions experience
little or no increase.
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Level of Articles Per Person, Unfiltered, All Newspapers Percent Change Compared to the Previous Quarter,Unfiltered, All Newspapers
2007,
Qtr 3
2007,
Qtr 4
2008,
Qtr 1
2008,
Qtr 2
2008,
Qtr 3
Figure 10: Pessimism in the Past Recession
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Level of Articles Per Person, No Jobs/Local Stories,
National Newspapers Only
Percent Change Compared to the Previous Quarter, No
Jobs/Local Stories, National Papers Only
2007,
Qtr 3
2007,
Qtr 4
2008,
Qtr 1
2008,
Qtr 2
2008,
Qtr 3
Figure 11: Pessimism in the Past Recession
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4.2 The Causal Effect of Media Pessimism on Labor Market Outcomes
Having described the flow of pessimism across the U.S. over the past recession, we turn to estimating the effects of this flow on
labor market outcomes. Table 2 displays summary statistics for each measure of media pessimism and number of covariates to be
included in the regressions; these figures are tabulated to aid interpretation of the results below. For more details about all of the
specifications please see section 3.4 which discusses identification in detail. Note that for ease of reading, all the regression tables
are located in section 8, rather than inter-spaced within the descriptions below.
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Effects of News on Total Employment Tables ?? and 8 shows employment regressed on articles per person and articles per reader
respectively, with each column representing an increasingly rigorous specification. The dependent variable in these regressions is
the log of total employment per person9, as measured by the BLS’s quarterly workforce indicators. Column one displays estimates
using ordinary least squares, controlling for the demographic characteristics listed in table ??. The OLS point estimate will be
biased if any uncontrolled variable jointly affects APP and employment. As explained in section 3, the introduction of county and
quarter fixed effects can help us cope with this issue by controlling for any confounds whose effects are constant in space or time;
column two incorporates these fixed effects. The first lag of APP is also included in all specifications, since changes in the volume
of pessimistic news may take some time to effect employment patterns. Here, articles per person is found to have a negative effect
on employment at the 5% significance level, while the corresponding per-reader figure was insignificant.
Column three implements content analysis to filter out articles referring to either employment or local conditions; the details
of this procedure are described in section 3. Column four repeats the same regression, but introduces county and state-by-quarter
fixed effects. In this specification, the impact of pessimistic news on employment is identified from variation between different
counties in the same state and quarter. Here, both APP and APR are found to negatively affect employment, with the per-reader
figure remaining robust to state-by-quarter dummies.
Columns five and six maintain the filtering of articles, but only uses articles from the three sources in my sample with national
circulation: the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and USA Today. As mentioned in the identification section, we expect
these national papers to be even less sensitive to local employment conditions in any given county. Here again we find negative
estimates, with the per-reader figure significant to five percent even with county and state-by-quarter fixed effects imposed.
Job Creation and Destruction The jobs data released in the QWI are highly detailed and contains separate measures for hiring
and separations. Tables 9 though 12 display regressions analogous to the results above but with job creation and destruction on the
left hand side. The pattern of results for hiring is similar to those for employment, with a number of exceptions. First, virtually all
of the results are now significant to the more rigorous state-by-quarter fixed effect. Second, the absolute magnitude of the effects
are much larger, particularly when using articles from only national sources. For separations, the effects are more ambiguous. Most
specifications, particularly the more rigorous ones, find a positive but insignificant contemporaneous effect. In contrast, the lagged
effects appear to be consistently negative and are significant in some specifications.
The clear take away from these tables is that the effect of pessimistic news on employment appears to be driven by changes
in hiring rather than separations. In fact, pessimistic news in the previous quarter appears to suppress job destruction rather than
promoting it. Interestingly, these results are results are consistent with recent findings in the empirical literature on labor market
dynamics. While traditional models of employment have emphasized the role of separations in driving countercyclical employment,
new studies imply that the job-finding rate is instead the key player (Shimer, 2007; Yashiv, 2006; Hall, 2005). For example, Hall
(2005) finds that while involuntary separations increased during the 2001-2003 recession, this effect was nearly canceled out by a
sharp reduction in the quit rate. Overall, separations during the recession remained nearly constant, with fluctuations in the total
unemployment driven almost entirely by changes in job-finding.
Importantly, this asymmetric effect of bad news on hiring and separations also argues that simultaneity isn’t biasing our results.
This is because layoffs are much more newsworthy than a simple lack of hiring - between 2008 and 2010, articles mentioning layoffs
outnumbered articles mentioning hiring by more than a factor of three to one in the Lexis Nexis Database. If our results are driven
by newspapers covering local job losses, we would expect the coefficient on separations to have a large, positive and statistically
significant point estimate, with a much weaker effect on hiring. This is the opposite of what we find.
Changes in Effect Size over the Business Cycle Do the size of our estimates change over the course of the past recession? There
are a number of reasons to believe that this might occur. For example, suppose that workers possess heterogeneous productivity, and
that the least productive workers are laid off at the beginning of the recession. The remaining more productive workers then face a
9Almost all of the results to be discussed also hold in levels with a higher level of significance. However, normality testing of the residuals suggested that using
a logged dependent variable is more appropriate for these specifications
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lower probability of being terminated, regardless of how much bad news is printed. Recent theoretical papers have considered this
possibility (Villena-Roldan, 2010). Alternatively, imagine that the areas receiving a disproportionate quantity of bad news over-react
by drastically cutting hiring. In subsequent quarters, job creation could rebound as employers in those counties recognize that the
news shock they received was spurious.
Tables 13 through 15 break down the effects on both job creation and job destruction over the course of the recession, and show
some signs of this pattern. For example, while the point estimates for hiring and employment remain negative between 2007 and
2009, they diminish in precision; the estimate in 2010 is actually positive but insignificant. Separations also show an interesting
trend, with a positive (albeit insignificant) sign in 2007 and reversing in subsequent years. It’s possible that pessimistic news does
lead to layoffs in the early stages of the recession, with the suppression of voluntary separations kicking in later in the cycle.
Tables 13 though 15 are also a first-pass at addressing a question which we haven’t yet asked. This question can be levied against
any theory which invokes a feedback mechanism to explain business cycle fluctuations: namely, what makes the feedback stop?
After all, if bad news begets unemployment, and unemployment begets bad news, wouldn’t the economy worsen indefinitely? One
possible answer is that agent’s reactions to bad news exhibit some kind of diminishing returns. It’s not unreasonable to assume that
once the airwaves become saturated with dire headlines, additional pessimistic information becomes relatively inconsequential.
Another possibility is that economic fundamentals intervene. For example, a car dealer might fear that spooked customers will
stop buying cars (and reduce his labor force accordingly), but only up to a point: cars go out of service at a certain rate, there is
always some demand for new automobiles. These facts about supply and demand cannot be disputed no matter how pessimistic the
news, and may serve to break the feedback cycle once the economy is pushed beyond a certain point. Whatever the reason, our
results are consistent with the idea that pessimism makes the greatest impact the beginning of a downturn, with the coefficients on
separations and hiring reversing in sign and diminishing in precision as the recession drags on.
Cross-Industry Comparison Table 16 presents the effect on employment for level-two NAICS industries, using the most rigorous
specification in table ??. These estimates are useful not only because they reveal differences in each industry’s response to media
pessimism, but because this heterogeneity can again be used to rule out reverse-causation. If we believe that our results are driven by
pessimistic news dampening employment, we would interpret a larger coefficient in this table as an industry which is more sensitive
to bad economic news. If we instead believe that these results are driven by losses in employment generating media coverage, then
the reciprocals of this coefficient would represent the number of articles per person generated by the loss of one job. In other words,
these reciprocals would represent the relative news-worthiness of job losses in a given industry.
Jobsit = βAPPit + other terms
APPit =
1
β
Jobsit + other terms
The third column in table 16 displays these reciprocated coefficients, while column 4 displays an independent measure of news-
worth. This measure was computed by dividing total job losses in a given industry against the number of newspaper articles in the
Lexis Nexis database describing layoffs in that industry. If we believe that reverse causality is a problem in our estimation, we would
expect the quantities in these two columns to be positively correlated in absolute value. In fact, we find that they exhibit a weak
negative correlation (-0.19). Instead, our coefficients are more correlated (albeit still weakly, with a coefficient of 0.21) with the
decline in output in each industry during the recession itself. This supports the interpretation that the negative sign on our estimates
is the results of industries cutting employment upon hearing negative news, in anticipation of a reduction in aggregate demand.
Looking at the list of industries, we can see a qualitative agreement with this theory. Industries which are particularity cyclical,
such as construction, retail trade, or accommodation exhibit large coefficients, while recession-proof industries such as agriculture
or health care have positive and insignificant point estimates. This pattern of results is difficult to explain if we believe that they
arise from the media’s coverage of layoffs in each industry.
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Additional Checks Tables 17 and 18 repeat the most rigorous specification above (Table ??, Columns (4) and (6)) but restrict the
sample to the set of counties in which more than 85% of all subscribers read the same newspaper. These counties represent areas
dominated by a single print publication and represent roughly a third of all counties. As argued above, county level fixed effects
will control for the influence of confounding variables so long as the newspaper subscribership pattern in each county is based
on time-invariant traits. This is more likely to be true in these single-source counties, where subscribership can only vary due to
whether an agent subscribes to a paper, not which paper that agent subscribes to. More formally, recall that articles per person can
be written as:
APPit = (PenRateit)
∑
j sources
(SubSharej,it) (Articlesj,t)
For single source counties, the middle term reduces to unity.
J = 1 ⇒ APPit = (PenRateit) (Articlesj,t)
For articles per reader, which doesn’t contain the term PenRateit, this independent variable further reduces to the total count of
pessimistic articles printed by national papers. We find here that while our results diminish in significance due to a reduction of the
sample size, the per-subscriber effects remain significant. Further, the sign of the effects are all consistent with previous estimates.
Tables 19 and 20 also repeat the most rigorous regression in table ??, but include only non-urban areas, defined as areas with
a population density of less than 500 persons per square mile. As mentioned in the identification section, our use of national
news in national papers assumes that these papers can be viewed as exogenous to conditions in any particular county. However,
this assumption might fail for the counties in which these papers are based (New York City and Washington DC) and for locales
considered symbolic of the nation’s economic state, such as Detroit or silicon valley. The dropping of urbanized areas deals with
both of this issues, and does not lead to significant changes in our results.
5 Discussion
The findings above can be summarized as follows:
1. The signals agents receive about the state of the economy the vary much more greatly in time and space the actual condition
of the economy.
2. Pessimistic news has a negative effect on total employment and hiring, and mixed effects on separations. These effects are
most prominent at the beginning of a business cycle contraction.
3. The pattern of effects - particularly the stronger results for hiring as compared to separations, and industry specific estimates,
suggest that reverse causation isn’t driving our results.
This paper argues that the most parsimonious interpretation of the evidence above is that exposure to pessimistic economic news can
dampen labor market activity, especially new hiring. On the face of it, this claim doesn’t seem very extreme. To admit that different
counties will adjust their behavior when exposed to differing levels of bad news simply means that agents act on information they
receive from the news media. Presumably, this is the reason many people read the news in the first place.
However, the detection of media-feedback raises broader questions for our understanding of the business cycle. What is the
significance of the the media’s effect, compared to more traditional sources of business cycle amplification? How do these results
bear on related topics in macroeconomic theory, such as the existence sunspot equilibria and the Keynesian notion of animal spirits?
And finally, what policy implications can be drawn from these findings? This section will discuss these questions in detail.
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Quantifying the Media’s Significance Is the media’s impact on unemployment a secondary correction, or a significant first-order
effect? This question can be approached in two ways. One is to simply predict what employment in a given county and quarter would
have been had no pessimistic news been delivered to that county, holding constant all other covariates. The difference between this
number and the same prediction using observed levels of news, summed across counties, would constitute the total employment
effect of the media in any given period. This number can then be compared with observed changes in total employment over the
course of our sample.
Figure 12 displays the results of this procedure. Here, the blue bars represent total employment in a given quarter, compared to
their per-recession values in 2007 for the corresponding quarters (note that this quarter-by-quarter comparison is necessary due to
the seasonality of employment). The red bars display the quantity of these job losses which is attributable to the media’s influence.
The figure to the right simply plots the relative size of the blue and red bars.
We can see that the reduction in employment due to media-feedback is on the order of half a million persons per quarter. The
effect of the media is particularly pronounced at the beginning of the recession, and fades as the recession progresses. This pattern
shouldn’t be surprising given figure 7, as the spike in pessimistic articles is relatively short lasting, falling off significantly after
2009. In contrast, employment remains suppressed until the end of the sample, remaining lower than average even at the time of
writing this paper.
We also need to keep in mind that these estimates tally the effects of newspaper articles only. The total impact of the media
would need to incorporate all news sources, including television, radio, and the internet. Given that twice as many people get their
news from TV, and roughly equal numbers get their news online (albeit, sometimes from electronic versions of popular newspapers),
the total effect of the media is likely to be larger than our estimates here.
Figure 12: The relative size of the media’s effect attenuates over the recession
Another way to assess the impact of the media is to find a specific economic event which generated bad press, and compare the
direct impact of that event with the impact of the press that it generated. This analysis was preformed for the collapse of Lehman
Brother Holdings in 2008. The first-order impact on the labor market from this event was the loss of employment for Lehman’s
some 26,000 workers. This event also generated an incredible amount of bad press. Taking coverage only from a two day window
before and after the Lehman bankruptcy, we find some 760 news stories across 114 U.S. newspapers. In counties which subscribe
to those papers, this would cause a significant increase to the flow of pessimistic news. For the average county, this single highly
publicized event increased the number of pessimistic articles by more than 60% in the third quarter of 2008. This shock would have
a significant effect on total employment.
For example, Autagua county Alabama received nearly a 100% shock to pessimism per capita as a result of coverage of the
Lehman Brothers collapse – an increase from 0.239 to 0.443 articles per person. Using the estimates in table 6 column 4, this would
have reduced employment in Autauga county by 19 persons that quarter. Nearby Dekalb county experienced a smaller increase in
pessimism, from .395 to .485; however, since it has a larger population, this would have still caused a reduction in employment by
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some 11 jobs. Summing across the country we find the total impact on employment to be some 300,000 jobs. This is more than ten
times larger than the immediate employment impact.
Of course, we have to take this kind of counterfactual estimate with a grain of salt. For one, we are assuming that the impact of a
article about Lehman Brothers have the same effect as an average pessimistic article. For another, it’s difficult to say how many jobs
were lost in the collapse of Lehman due to conventional modes of amplification - for example, the reduction in aggregate demand
resulting from the employees’ lost income. However, this example highlights the potential of the mass media to affect aggregate
outcomes. Even counties with no direct connection to the Lehman Brother’s failure would have been affected by the pessimistic
news it generated. And though the impact in each county is small, the incredible reach of the media – the impact on countless
readers across the US - makes the total loss formidable.
Sunspots, Animal Spirits, and Amplification I want to connect the idea of media feedback to two notions which I’ve mentioned
over the course of the paper, but whose definitions I haven’t made explicit. The first is the notion of “sunspots”. This is the idea
that factors totally orthogonal to economic reality can nonetheless impact economic outcomes by altering people’s beliefs. To see
the connection, consider that different counties in the United States received different levels of pessimistic news at the eve of last
recession. But what was the “correct” level of news for a county to receive? Whatever it was, idiosyncrasies in the way that news is
delivered made sure that most county did not receive that level, and as a consequence experienced somewhat different labor market
outcomes. In other words, the results above constitute evidence for media-driven sunspots.
But there’s a more nuanced way to think about this. If we concede that counties are differentially affected by the media, we must
admit the possibility that the same county, had it received a different level of news, would experience a different economic outcome.
If we apply this to the U.S. as a whole, it would mean that events which are exogenous to the state of the economy, but which
globally affect media coverage, say, competing coverage of a war, might make a business cycle fluctuation stronger or weaker. It
also means that all recessions are somewhat worse than they would otherwise be if the media were less of a presence. This is an
important point to understand - a sunspot doesn’t have to be all or nothing. Rather than picturing a totally spurious shock to bad
news causing a recession out of nowhere, it’s more accurate think of the media as a channel of amplification. While the strength
of most such channels depend on deep economic parameters (such as the elasticity of labor supply), the strength of the media’s
amplification depends largely on non-economic factors.
What’s more, consider the fact that everyone with a mouth is, at some level, a news organization. If agents begin to hear gloomy
news from the people around them, wouldn’t this affect their behavior for the same reasons as reading that same news in the paper?
Any mechanism which assists the spread of economic information can play this role. By this logic, the media is part of a class of
amplification mechanisms, ones which involve the way information is shared in the economy.
Connecting the Dots - The Role of Psychology
What is the connection between media-feedback and the Keynesian notion of animal spirits? Animal spirits are psychological
sunspots - agents basing their behavior not on economic fundamentals, but on subjective states such as fear or uncertainty. Above, I
find that pessimistic news lowers employment largely by suppressing hiring. Presumably, this effect is mediated by business owners
listening to the news and changing their beliefs about the future of the economy. Are subjective states such as fear part of this change
in beliefs? It’s difficult to answer this question without a measure of psychological sentiment; unfortunately, no such measures are
disaggregated at the county level.
However, a viable proxy for this measure can be obtained using search data from google trends. Google collects search data
at the DMA level and compiles this data into an index of how many times a particular term is searched compared to other terms.
Figure 13 plots the number of times users googled the word “recession” against the University of Michigan’s consumer confidence
index and shows a clear anti-correlation. While not a perfect proxy, it seems reasonable to assume that most people searching
for “recession” are at least concerned about the state of the economy. This variable can help us connect the dots between media
sentiment, consumer sentiment, and economic outcomes.
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Figure 13: Median level of Google searches for the word “recession” across all counties vs. the University of Michigan’s consumer
confidence index
Imagine an OLS regression of google searches for the word “recession” on employment:
Jobsit = c+ βSearchesit + γXit + εit (3)
Estimating this equation is problematic for the same reasons that estimating jobs on news is problematic. First, unobserved
factors may jointly affect the level of search queries and employment - for example, differential access to the internet. Moreover,
these searches are likely to be generated by job losses themselves. One approach to overcome these issues is to identify a valid
instrument for the number of google searches. This instrument must be relevant - that is, it must be correlated with the number of
google searches, and it must be uncorrelated with the error term in the equation above.
In section 3.4, I argue that with fixed effects in place, and after the treatments for simultaneity (dropping articles, using only
national sources), APP is uncorrelated with the error term in a regression on jobs. Note that condition is equivalent to satisfying
the exclusion restriction for the specification above. In other words, if media-pessimism and google searches are correlated, then
media-pessimism serves as a viable instrument for consumer sentiment as measured by google trends.
Table 5: Effects of Google Searches on Employment, Instrumented by APP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage Tot. Emp. Hires Seps.
APP, No Local/Jobs, Natl. 20.6326∗∗∗
(0.000)
Google Searches -0.0021∗∗∗ -0.0068∗∗∗ -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.805)
Observations 47683 46642 46418 46609
Wald-F(1st Stage) 119.7930 118.5358 118.6318
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. 1st stage is Google searches regressed on APP and demographic controls with county and quarter FEs.
3. 2nd stage is identical to column (5) in table 6, but with instrumented Google searches replacing
APP; standard errors clustered at the county level.
4. Due to heteroskedasticity, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic is used.
Column (1) in table 5 displays a regression of google searches for recession against APP, dropping local and employment related
articles and using only national papers. Reverse causation shouldn’t be a major problem here (as it’s unlikely that google searches
themselves cause bad news), and unobserved heterogeneity is dealt with in the same manner as above - county and quarter fixed
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effects and time varying demographic controls. Note that negative news has a strong positive impact on the number of searches; the
Wald F-statistic in the first stage is quite large, implying that weak instruments isn’t a concern.
Columns (2) through (5) displays labor market performance regressed on google searches instrumented by APP. The specifica-
tion is the same as above, with county and quarter fixed effects. We see the same general pattern as the tables in the results section;
precisely estimated negative effects on employment and hiring and an insignificant effect on separations. To the extent that these
google searches are a valid proxy for individual sentiment, these results indicate that sentiment has a causal effect on economic
outcomes as the animal spirits hypothesis would suggest.
On could argue that individuals who search for the word “recession” on google are acting rationally, rather than in fear. It might
be the case that as individuals sense a deteriorating economy, they go to google seeking more information. However, remember
that our instrument is the number of pessimistic articles as reported by national papers, dropping articles which pertain to local
conditions or to jobs. Thus, the variation in instrumented google searches is being driven by regional variation in media coverage
about the national economy. As I argued above, since there is only one state of the national economy, these variations in the media’s
volume should be viewed as orthogonal to economic fundamentals. Therefore, the variations in public sentiment that they cause
should be viewed as orthogonal as well. In other words, the results above suggest that consumer sentiment sunspots, caused by
media sunspots, can impact labor market outcomes.
Media-feedback and Rational Expectations Is it possible to reconcile the results above with standard DSGE models, and in
particular, with the assumption of rational expectations which appears in nearly all such models? In this section, I will argue that the
answer is yes, although whether such models are the ideal candidate to portray these effects is an open question. Recent research
has shown that many DSGE model can exhibit dynamics consistent with sunspots. To derive such a model, one usually begins with
a non-stochastic framework that exhibits a locally stable steady state. Such models often possess “indeterminacies” - a continuum
of non-stationary solutions which converge towards (but never reach in a finite time) the steady state. In a stochastic context, it’s
possible to randomize across these indeterminacies to generate multiple solution paths, all of which satisfy the rational expectations
assumption. Each of these rational expectations equilibria are consistent with a particular set of beliefs, beliefs which are realized
in expectation if agents act on them. For a detailed example of such a model, see Farmer (1999).
This approach has the advantage of preserving the current paradigm. However, it does have a number of drawbacks. First, we
need to choose a model in which these stationary equilibria occur. Sometimes this requires parametrizations which are inconsistent
with empirical measurements (Herrendorf et al., 2000). Moreover, the solution is very ad hoc - the framework doesn’t distinguish
between sunspots arising for different reasons, nor does it explain what the size of the sunspot perturbations should be (it simply
defines this size when it sets the variance of the shock ut). In reality, these questions are answered by structural factors associated
with each type of sunspot. For example, the magnitude of the media’s effect might depend on the number of news organizations
and their popularity, while the effects of psychological attitude might depend on behavioral parameters of agents within society, say,
their level of risk aversion.
What’s more, since this solution is consistent with rational expectations, it still posits that agent’s predictions of the future (in
expectation) were in line with what actually transpired. The data are silent on this question - while our results show that the news
had an effect on economic outcomes, there’s no way to know whether agents expected exactly those outcome to transpire when they
acted on that news in the first place. In fact, it’s very difficult to conceive of how such evidence could be obtained - did residents
of a county which lost 30 jobs expect to lose that exact number? In this sense, the difficulty of falsifying the notion of rational
expectations is one of its major weaknesses.
It’s not the goal of this paper to judge whether media-feedback is best modeled within or without the context of rational expec-
tations. In some ways, our choice as macroeconomists is limited because in the current generation of models, rational expectations
is employed largely for the purpose of tractability. This paper merely argues that media-feedback and related phenomenon should
be modeled, however we choose to do it. There has been a tendency to view sunspots - even sunspots within the context of rational
expectations - as pathological. My hope is that the empirical evidence presented here can ease the stigma against such solutions.
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Policy Implications I’ve argued above that the media serves as a channel of business cycle amplification, implying that recessions
are worse than they would otherwise be if the news media was less of a presence. But what, if any policy implications follow from
this conclusion? At first pass, it might seem like there’s nothing to be done about the issue; after all, it’s not as if the media could be
prevented from covering negative economic events.
But in another way, the existence of the media effect has important implications for government policy. This is because media-
feedback implies that government intervention can affect the economy in at least two ways. First, policies such as monetary
expansion can directly impact economic fundamentals. For example, in traditional Neo-Keynesian models, price rigidity leads to a
rise in real income when the money supply is increased, leading to gains in output and employment. But a non-zero media effect
implies that news of intervention itself could also affect economic performance, regardless of the policy’s impact on fundamentals.
This idea is not as far flung as it might sound. In a study of the European Central Bank, Berger et al. (2009) find that while
real economic conditions influence reporting, “ECM communications - in particular, though it’s press conference on meeting days
is able to influence both the extent and the favorability of the media’s coverage of it’s decisions.” Konstantinou and Tagkalakis
(2008) find evidence that expansionary fiscal policy improves business and consumer confidence and suggest that this improvement
should be viewed as as secondary goal of such interventions. This idea that the government’s media presence can affect economic
sentiment has long been recognized - even during the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration oversaw a significant media
campaign to sell the economic policies that were being put in place to fight the contraction.10
It has been frequently argued that in the past recession, the government did a poor job of marketing it’s numerous interventions
to the public. For example, a survey by Harris Interactive revealed that only 23% of Americans think that the TARP program
helped the economy. In contrast, a survey of economists conducted by the University of Chicago showed that 80% of economists
believed that TARP was beneficial. Treasure secretary Henry Paulson has frequently stated that while he doesn’t regret bailing out
the banks, he erred in failing to communicating the rationale of this move to Americans at large. Presumably, if economic agents
are unconvinced that a given government program will help the economy, it will not stimulate the economy though the channel of
public sentiment described above.
A more detailed analysis of this effect is beyond the scope of this paper. It may be the case that the media effect of government
policy is small compared to it’s impact on economic fundamentals. However, it’s also the case that marketing a given policy
intervention is likely to be far cheaper than the intervention itself. Perhaps a small investment in cultivating a positive media
presense could pay large dividends for the government over the course of an entire recession.
10For example, Roosevelt’s famous “fireside chats” where a series of radio messages designed to inform the public of the government’s progress in combating the
recession.
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Part II
Uncertainty and Risk Averse Firms in DSGE
Imagine that the management at a large U.S. firm is faced with the following choice:
1. Continue making 1 million dollars (per quarter) in profits
2. Play in a lottery in which there was a 50% chance of making zero profit next quarter, and a 50% chance of making two million
dollars in profit.
Consideration of this type of lottery is how microeconomists define risk aversion for individuals. Faced with the choice above over
their own incomes, individuals are consistently observed to favor the first option. This paper seeks to understand the macroeco-
nomic consequences if firms also favor the first option. In other words, it asks: how would the economy behave if firms (or their
management) were risk averse in profits, just as households are risk averse in consumption?
Why does this question merit consideration? In the first place, there is broad micro-level evidence that firms do behave in a
risk averse manner, evidence which I will summarize in the following pages. More importantly, the assumption that firms are risk
averse leads to qualitatively different business-cycle dynamics. Risk averse firms seek to smooth profits and respond to economic
uncertainty with precautionary behavior, just as households do. As I will argue in greater detail, this behavior can resolve a challenge
faced by a broad class of RBC models: the difficulty of triggering an economic contraction with a Keynesian demand-side shock.
Demand Shocks
The prototypical aggregate demand shock asks us to imagine a scenario in which consumers, worried about the future of the
economy, cut back on spending. As demand contracts, output and employment fall. Keynes called this scenario the "paradox of
thrift"; with the economy stagnating due to collective savings behavior, government spending is needed to boost aggregate demand
and halt the downturn.
In the modern DSGE paradigm, this type of scenario can be modeled in two ways. First, one can apply a direct shock to the
consumer’s intertemporal utility function. For example, a sudden increase in consumers’ discount rate β will result in lowered
consumption and increased savings. More recently, a growing literature argues that an uncertainty shock, an increase in the variance
of a stochastic variable driving the model, will also lead to a contraction in aggregate demand. Faced with a more uncertain future,
risk averse households will engage in precautionary saving, causing consumption to fall in a manner analogous to a first-moment
shock.
However, it’s widely understood that this type of model does not display the intuitive response. Instead, such a demand shock is
usually expansionary. The reason is the equivalence between savings and investment. As households put more of their money away,
investment increases, interest rates fall, and the capital stock expands. In models with an elastic supply of labor, households also
engage in precautionary employment, increasing hours worked in order to further boost savings and hedge against the future. With
both inputs into the production function rising in response to the shock, the economy enters a long term boom.
5.1 Approaches in the Literature
Given the conceptual desirability of demand driven recessions, numerous authors have tackled this "co-movement problem". Table
1 summarizes this literature; as whole, these papers take one of two main approaches. The first is to modify the consumer side of the
problem so as to reduce the intensity of savings. For example, Yi (2006) finds that when consumers’ utility function exhibits habit
formation, an increase in β can lead to a reduction in investment. This is because rational households know that they will "get used
to" lower consumption levels, and find it less necessary to save. While this approach can restore realistic business cycle behavior, it
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Type of Demand Shock Ingredients Used in Model
Basu and Bundick (2012) 2nd moment shock to consumer utility Nominal Rigidities (price only)a
2nd moment shocks to technology Countercyclical markups
Adjustment cost (capital)
Huo and Rios-Rull (2013) 1st moment shock to consumer utility Labor & Capital adjustment costs
Search frictions (complex)b
Variable capital utilization
Bai et al. (2012) 1st moment shock to consumer utility Search frictions (complex)
Yi Wen (2006) 1st moment shock to consumer utility Habit Formation
Variable Capital Utilization
Adjustment Costs (capital)
Bloom et al. (2012) 2nd moment shock to technology Adjustment costs (Labor & Capital)
Search frictions
Bloom (2009) 2nd moment shock to technology Adjustment costs (Labor & Capital)c
Leduc & Liu (2012) 1st moment shock to consumer utility Search Frictions
Nominal Rigidities (wage and price)
aTheir model also works under sticky wages, but these are not required to generate realistic co-movement
bHere, there are search frictions not only for labor, but for varieties of goods
cThis was an earlier paper with most results holding in partial equilibrium, though the author gives a heuristic argument that they also hold in general equilibrium
Table 6: Approaches in the Literature to Resolving the the Demand Shock Co-movement Problem
weakens the notion of a demand-driven recession in the first place. After all, if consumers are not cutting back, in what sense is the
recession still caused by a reduction in aggregate demand?
The alternative approach, which I employ in this paper, is to modify the firm side of model so as to decrease the demand for
investment in response to the shock. The intuition comes from economics 101: when supply and demand curves both shift to the left,
quantity will fall if the reduction in demand dominates in magnitude. For example, Basu & Bundick (2012) envision an imperfect
competition framework with counter-cyclical price markups. They show that in the presence of sticky prices, households’ choice
to engage in precautionary employment drives up firms’ markup over marginal cost. This larger markup increases the degree of
monopoly power in the economy and so causes factor demand and output to fall. This reduction in demand overwhelms the supply
effect in both factor markets, causing investment and employment to fall as well.
Despite this broad range of solutions, the current literature leaves much on the table. One problem is the sheer number of
mechanisms necessary to trigger the recession. For example, Huo and Rios-Rull (2013) incorporate not only search frictions in
both labor and goods, but two types of adjustment costs and variable capital utilization. What’s more, they show that in their
model, all of these ingredients are necessary in order to facilitate a demand driven contraction. Compared with technology shocks,
which parsimoniously deliver business cycle stylized facts with little additional complexity, these workarounds to make the notion
of an aggregate demand recession seem increasingly forced. A related issue is the wide range of approaches taken across different
papers. Some models employ imperfect competition, while others don’t. Some require search frictions, while others don’t. These
approaches beg the question: what is the minimum set of ingredients necessary to make demand-driven recessions viable?
This paper will contribute to the literature by proposing a feature which, alone, can render demand shocks contractionary. I
will show that by introducing risk aversion on the side of producers, realistic business cycle behavior can be recovered in a model
without nominal rigidities, search frictions, or adjustment costs. Two different types of demand-side shocks can trigger this effect:
an uncertainty shock to future technology, and uncertainty over future consumer demand. I will argue that the later is more realistic
of the two. These types of shocks are also considered in Bloom et al. (2012) and Basu and Bundick (2012). This paper corroborates
their results in a simpler model, and proposes that risk averse firms are a general explanation for the action of such shocks.
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5.2 Risk Averse Firms
To see why corporate risk aversion matters, imagine that an uncertainty shock compels consumers to engage in precautionary
savings. In the absence of other effects, this will increase the supply of loanable funds and drive up investment. But note there is
something deeply asymmetric about this story: why wouldn’t firms, too, respond to this increase in uncertainty? In business surveys,
uncertainty - particularly uncertainty about consumer demand, is often cited as the primary reason for firms laying off workers or
scaling down operations (Lourenco and Lowe, 1994). After all, firms must frequently make long term inlays - whether it’s installing
capital or hiring workers, and the profitability of these decisions is highly contingent on the realizations of future macroeconomic
variables.
This line of reasoning suggests that we treat firms (or their decision makers) as risk averse is a manner similar to households. To
demonstrate the consequences of doing so, consider a simple two period model in which firms choose the optimal level of investment
for the next period. In particular, imagine that firms profits in the first period is equal to output, investment and rents for capital.
pi1 = Ak
α
− rk − i, α < 1
pi2 = A
′(k + i)α − r(k + i)
In the second period, investment is installed as capital; for purposes of simplicity, we ignore depreciation and set the price of
both output and a unit of investment to one. Suppose that in the next period, the level of technology in the economy is subject to an
unknown shock, and distributed as follows:
A′ =

A+ ε, Pr =
1
2
A− ε, Pr = 1
2
In the absence of risk aversion, total expected profit for both periods is given by
E(piT ) = Ak
α
− rk − i +
1
2
[(A+ ε)(k + i)α − r(k + i) + (A− ε)(k + i)α − r(k + i)]
= Akα − rk − i+A(k + i)α − r(k + i)
Unsurprisingly this expression is invariant in epsilon, the magnitude of uncertainty regarding future productivity. The linearity
of the productivity parameter α in the firm’s profit equation ensures that an uncertainty shock has no effect. Now imagine that
that firms maximize not total profit, but a concave function of in-period profit, just as consumers maximize a concave function of
in-period consumption. In this simple example, the CRRA utility function will be used.
u(pit) =
pi1−σt
1− σ
Expected utility across the two periods is now given by
E(uT ) = A · k
a
− rk − i+
1
2
[(A+ ε) · (k + i)
a
− r · (k + i)]
1−σ
+
1
2
[(A− ε) · (k + i)
a
− r · (k + i)]
1−σ
Figure 14plots this total utility as a function of investment for a varying levels of epsilon and sample parameter values (α =
2
3
, σ = 0.6).11 Note that as the level of uncertainty increases in the economy, the optimal level of investment falls. It’s not difficult
to see why. When epsilon is high, the level of capital which maximizes second period profits is large, encouraging high investment
in the first period. However, the payoff from this high profit state is subdued due to the concavity of the utility function. Thus,
11For particular values of α and σ, this simple model can be solved analytically; I do this in appendix A.
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Figure 14: Expected Utility from Profits as a Function of Investment, Under Varying Levels of Uncertainty: top, ε = 0, middle,
ε = 85, bottom, ε = 100.
while a high level of capital is heavily rewarded in the high technology state, it is even more heavily punished in the low technology
state. The risk averse firm therefore reduces levels of investment in response to increased economic uncertainty. This reduction
in investment demand is exactly what is needed to stop the increase in investment which plagues models attempting to trigger a
recession using a demand shock. Even if households save, total investment can fall if firms’ demand curve for investment shifts far
enough to the left. In the full model below, the pattern exhibited by this two-period case will be borne out in a general equilibrium
context.
5.3 Evidence that Firms are Risk Averse
Relatively few papers feature models with risk averse firms, particularly within a DSGE framework12. Acknowledging this, I wish
to present some independent arguments that this assumption isn’t unreasonable, and to address some possible concerns.
Executive Compensation The easiest way to imagine a risk averse firm is to simply assume that that the manager of the firm
collects the profits as income. Since individuals are known to be risk averse in consumption levels, this would automatically imply
that the firm behaves in a risk averse manner. This assumption holds for a privately owned sole proprietorship; some 75% of all US
business are organized in this manner. However, it must be admitted that while sole proprietorships account for a great number of
firms, they are responsible for only 5% of all sales13.
But even in a large corporation, there is abundant evidence that manager’s salaries, bonuses and other compensations are closely
linked to the firm’s profitability. Hall and Liebman (1998) use detailed firm level data and find that improving company performance
from the industry median to the 70th percentile increases CEO salaries by some two million dollars, while diminishing firm perfor-
mance from the median to the 30th percentile causes compensation to fall by roughly the same amount. In general, they estimate
the elasticity of CEO’s total compensation to firm profits to be on the order of 3.9, with this figure nearly tripling between 1980
and 1994. This effect is further exacerbated by the fact that in large corporations, senior managments’ compensation increasingly
takes the form of stock options. It’s also been shown that stock performance is concave in profitability - investors punish unexpected
negative profits more than they rewards unexpected positive profits (Lopez & Rees, 2002). Note that since this concavity arises in
12Notable exceptions include Sandmo (1971), Pindyck (1982), and Carceles Poveda (2003)
13Corporations, which are the opposite of a sole proprietorship in the sense of separating the firm’s assets from those of its employees, account for 19% of all
firms but 87% of total sales
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the level of executive compensation itself, not the utility derived from it, it would result in risk averse behavior even if managers
themselves were risk neutral in consumption levels.
Cash Holding An additional line of evidence comes from firms’ cash holding behavior. Numerous studies suggest that firms hold
cash reserves in order to hedge against borrowing constraints and adverse economic shocks (Almedia et al, 2004, Faulkender and
Wang, 2006). The latter paper presents a theoretical model in which firms, particular those who are financially constrained, should
increase cash retention when faced with negative economic shocks and find empirical evidence to this effect. Interestingly, a line
of research in the behavioral literature suggests that this precautionary cash holding is not only subject to rational considerations
such as borrowing ability, but also the personal experience of decision makers. For example, managers who grew up during the
great depression (Malmendier et al, 2010), or who have been previously employed at firms facing financial difficulties (Dittmar and
Duchin, 2012) hold larger reserves and are more averse to debt.
Business Insurance A final piece of evidence for corporate risk aversion is the existence of business insurance. Firms of varying
sizes routinely insure themselves against a variety of possible losses. These include property insurance, business interruption
insurance, disaster insurance, and liability insurance both for worker injury and damages resulting from defective products. In net,
some 57% of all insurance premiums are paid by businesses (Hoyt and Khang, 1999). What’s more Mayers and Smith (1990)
find that closely held corporations are more likely to purchase insurance than firms with less concentrated ownership, and cite risk
aversion is the primary reason for these findings. Since no risk neutral agent would ever find it rational to purchase insurance, the
popularity of such products among firms is strong evidence that corporations can behave in a risk averse manner.
The Fisher Separation Theorem A set of results in the complete markets literature may cast some doubt on the evidence above.
The Fisher Separation Theorem states that in the presence of complete capital and insurance markets, firms will make investment
decisions which maximize their net present value, regardless of their shareholder’s attitudes towards risk. This theorem can be
viewed a special case of Modigliani-Miller theorem regarding corporate financing, and more generally, a consequence of the Arrow-
Debreu model of general equilibrium.
To understand why complete markets have this effect, imagine a firm owned by two partners who evenly split the company’s
earnings amongst themselves and who hold different attitudes toward risk. Now suppose that these partners must choose between
two investment projects, a high risk project with a greater expected return, and a low risk project with a smaller expected return. In
the absence of complete markets, the two partners might disagree on which project to engage, with the risk averse partner favoring
the low risk project despite the fact that this project does not maximize expected present value. However, if insurance markets are
complete, it would be rational for the risk loving partner to offer to pay his more hesitant counterpart in the event that the risky
project falls through. If such contracts are drawn optimally, shareholders will always find it rational to make the "pie as big as
possible", maximizing the present value of the firm’s income stream.
This heuristic example, while simplistic, also captures some potential pitfalls with this line of thought. In most publicly held
corporations, conflicts of interest between management and shareholders are common (Fizel & Kenneth, 2006; Jensen & Murphy,
1990). The problem is that in contrast to the above example, not all shareholders are created equal; in particular, some are directly
employed by the firm (as in the case of senior management), and some are not (in the case of a board member who is otherwise
unrelated to the firms’ operations). Shareholders directly employed by the firm are subject to that firms’ internal compensation
system, and well as organizational and behavioral forces such as intra-firm politics. What’s more, there is a large information
asymmetry between a CEO with detailed knowledge of the firm’s internal working and projects, and a shareholder who is not
employed by the corporation. All of these factors suggest that markets are not complete in the strong sense required by the Fisher
theorem, and that the risk attitudes of individual decision makers in firms are relevant in determining that firm’s investment choices.
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6 Model
Firms To illustrate the effect of corporate risk aversion, the rest of the model is deliberately kept as simple as possible. A
competitive firm produces a single consumption good with Cobb-Douglas technology, taking capital and labor as inputs. Since
many papers which explore the effects of uncertainty also include capital adjustment costs, these are introduced in the standard way
and will be turned off when analyzing the effects of risk aversion alone. The key feature of the model is that firms maximize the
present discounted value of a concave function of profits. This is exactly analogous to consumer’s intertemporal utility function; in
fact, as discussed previously, this can be viewed as the problem of an entrepreneur whose consumption is dictated by the income of
her firm.
max :
kt,lt,it
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtfu [pit (kt, lt)]
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it
pi(k) = ztf(kt, lt)− rtkt − wtlt − Φ
(
it
kt
)
kt
u(pit) =
pi
1−σf
t
1− σf
f(kt, lt) = k
α
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1−α
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Φ
(
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kt
)
= γ1
(
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)γ2
Households Households are also standard, supplying labor elastically and maximizing over a King Plosser & Rebelo utility
function. To model first and second moment changes to consumer demand, the households’ discount beta factor follows an AR-1
process. A utility function which is non-separable in consumption and labor is chosen because in the separable case, indeterminacy
is found across a wide range of parameter values. This is related to the result reported by Chin, Guo, and Lai (2012), who find
indeterminacy in a model with adjustment costs when the steady state wage-hours locus is steeper than households’ labor supply
curves.
max :
ct,lt,kt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βthtatut (ct, lt)
ut =
1
σh
[
ct(1− lt)
ψ
]σh
ct + it = wtlt + rtkt
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it
In many models that feature capital adjustment costs, households own the capital stock and incur those costs, while myopic
firms profit maximize in each period by setting the rental rate of capital equal to it’s marginal product. In such a model, firms are
only interested in the present period and can’t exhibit the dynamic effects (such as precautionary behavior) that this paper explores.
In contrast, households and firms in this model each make an investment decision separately. For households, capital constitutes
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the only savings asset. By investing, households sacrifice current consumption in exchange for receiving an income stream rk,
paid for by firms. On the other hand, firms also make the choice to install or remove capital. For firms, holding additional capital
means that more output can be produced in the next quarter, at the drawback of paying households rk and incurring adjustment
costs Φ
(
it
kt
)
. Note that firms do not "buy" capital from households, nor can they "sell" their capital stock to increase present
period profits. The most intuitive way to interpret this model is to imagine that in each period, household savings are loaned to
the firm through a frictionless financial intermediary. Firms use this money to install capital, and are charged interest accordingly.
Liquidating capital simply means firms returning the money to households, who then use it to increase consumption.
Both household and firm investment decisions are contingent on the value of the rt, which serves to clear the market for
investment in this model. In the context of an negative demand shock (say, due to an unexpected rise in economic uncertainty),
households wish to consume less and save more. On the other hand, firms view this demand shock as a reason to liquidate capital,
since consumer demand implies lower output, thus lowering the profit maximizing level of capital for the subsequent period.
Shocks The model features first and second moment shocks to both the technology parameter zt and βt. First moment shocks
follow the typical AR-1 process, with the added feature that the variance of each shock is itself an endogenous variable and governed
by it’s own AR-1 sequence. This follows the approach taken in Bloom et al. (2012) and Basu and Bundick (2012).
βt+1 = ρβat + σβeβt
σβt+1 = σβss(1− ρσβ ) + ρσβσσβ + uβt
zt+1 = zss(1− ρz) + ρzzt + σztezt
σzt+1 = σzss(1− ρσz ) + ρσzσzt + uzt
Implementation Computation implementation of the above model was preformed in dynare using a third order Taylor approxima-
tion about the deterministic steady state. As discussed in Basu and Bundick (2012), a third order expansion is the minimum needed
to capture the effects of uncertainty. In addition, the Blanchard & Khan conditions, which give sufficient criterion for stability in
the linear case, no longer guarantee stability in the third order model. Following standard practice, the pruning algorithm created by
Martin et al. (2013) is used to ensure nonexplosive behavior.
6.1 Governing Equations
Solving the maximization problem described above yields the following system of nonlinear difference equations.14
• Investment Demand
pit = ztk
α
t l
1−α
t − rtkt − wtlt − γ1
(
it
kt
)γ2
kt
βf
[
αzt+1k
α−1
t+1 l
1−α
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γ2
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• Investment Supply
14For simplicity, the expected value operator has been omitted from the beginning of each expression.
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• Labor Demand
(1− a)zt
(
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)
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• Labor Supply
ψct = wt(1− lt)
• Capital Evolution
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it
• Economy-Wide Budget Constraint
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α
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• Shock processes
at+1 = ρaat + varaeat
varat+1 = ρvaravarat + uzt
zt+1 = zss(1− ρz) + ρzzt + σztezt
σzt+1 = σzss(1− ρσz ) + ρσzσzt + uzt
6.2 Baseline Calibration
The following table summarizes the choice of parameters in the baseline calibration of the model. Where possible, values which
have reached consensus in the literature are used. For the parameters of the firms’ utility function, figures similar to households
are chosen, keeping with the idea that firm-level risk aversion arises from risk attitudes of individuals operating those firms. For
parameters whose value is unsettled, I analyze the model over the full range of values found in the literature - see the results section
for more details. Finally, for the AR-1 parameters of the second moment shocks, I use the values in Basu & Bundick (2012). The
results section will show that the performance of the model is not particulary sensitive to these parameters.
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Parameter Description Value Range in Literature
Firms
α Capital Share 0.33 Consensus
δ Depreciation Rate (Quarterly) 0.025 Consensus
φ1 Adj. Cost Level 0.1 [−1.75, 20]a
φ2 Adj. Cost Convexity 2 Consensus
βf Discount Factor for Profits 0.95 Novel Parameter
σf Firm Risk Aversion 2 Novel Parameter
Households
χ Disutility of Labor 0.35 Consensus
σh Household Risk Aversion 2 Consensus
Tech. Shocks
zss Steady State Tech. Level 1 Consensus (by convention)
ρz Persistence of 1st Moment Shocks 0.99 [0.85, 1]b
σzss Steady State Volatility 0.01 [0.0032, 0.063]c
ρσz Persistence of 2nd Moment Socks 0.83 Few Estimates, use B&B
σuz Volatility of 2nd Moment Shocks 0.0017 Few Estimates, use B&B
Preference Shocks
βss Steady State Discount Factor 0.99 Consensus
ρβ Persistence of First Moment Shocks 0.90 [0.82,0.98]d
σβss Steady State Volatility 0.02 [0.01,0.569]e
ρσβ Persistence of 2nd Moment Socks 0.83 Few Estimates, use B&B
σuβ Volatility of 2nd Moment Shocks 0.0017 Few Estimates, use B&B
Table 7: Baseline Parameterization and Comparison to Values Used in Literature
aCooper and Haltiwanger(2006), Hayashi (1982)
bGali & Rabanal (2005), Dedola & Neri (2006)
cSims (2011), Bloom (2011)
dPrimiceri et. al (2006), Yi (2006)
eBasu and Brent (2012), Primiceri et. al (2006)
7 Results
Summary
In the baseline parameterization, both technological and discount factor uncertainty shocks are found to be contractionary, while
a positive first moment discount factor shock is expansionary. This implies that while a demand shock due to a true increase in
patience cannot trigger a recession in this model, a demand shock arising from increased uncertainty can.
For uncertainty with respect to consumer demand (that is, a second moment shock to the discount factor), increasing the degree
of firm risk aversion worsens the recession, while increasing the degree of household risk aversion moderates it. This is consistent
with a picture in which precautionary behavior on both the firm and household side drive the economic response. For second
moment technology shocks, these elasticities are more complex and may be non-monotonic.
Changing the adjustment cost parameters, and in particular, the convexity parameter, impacts not only the behavior of model
variables, but their elasticities in both firm and corporate risk aversion. That is, the effects of increasing household’s or firm’s sigma
can depend on adjustment costs. While the model exhibits indeterminacy in the total absence of such costs, both second moment
shocks are still contractionary even if adjustment costs are set to vanishingly low values; this suggests that firm-side risk aversion is
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a sufficient condition for contractionary demand shocks in response to economic uncertainty.
Finally, in contrast to Yi (2006), the qualitative features of the above results are not found to be particularly sensitive to the
persistence of the shock processes.
7.1 Baseline Economy
Figures 17 and 18 show impulse responses for all model variables under the influence of the three types of demand shocks discussed
in the introduction. The impact of a negative first moment technology shock is also included for comparison. There are several
things to learn from this baseline specification.
First Moment Shocks Figure one reveals that the standard negative technology shock leads to responses which are in line with
business cycle stylized facts. In particular, output, hours worked, investment, and consumption are all seen to contract simultane-
ously. This robust and realistic co-movement between macroeconomic aggregates is why such shocks are so popular in the DSGE
literature.
In contrast, a first moment demand shock leads to the counter-intuitive behavior discussed in the introduction - a failure of the
so called "paradox of thrift". While an increase in consumer patience leads to a steep initial decline in consumption in favor of
savings, this savings behavior drives up investment. Interest rates also rise, indicating that demand for investment is expanding as
firms prepare to meet increased demand. In subsequent quarters, the expansion of the capital stock leads to a long lasting boom.
Contemporaneous output also increases due to the labor market effect of the preference shock. Employment rises while wages fall,
signaling an unambiguous expansion in labor supply; more patient households are willing to work more hours in order to accumulate
savings. Overall, this economy could represent a society where increased prudence on the part of households leads to long term
economic gains - a phenomenon which might be working in developing nations with high savings rates (Hamilton et al., 1999).
However, it is clearly not appropriate for modeling a recession caused by a Keynesian reduction in aggregate demand.
Second Moment Shocks Turning to the second moment shocks, let’s first examine the effects of an uncertainty shock on βt, the
consumer discount factor. Since this parameter governs the consumption-savings decision, such a shock would represent an increase
in the uncertainty of future consumer demand. In response to this shock, both investment and interest rates fall simultaneously,
consistent with a credit market dominated by a contraction in the demand for investment. As explained previously, the presence of
firm side risk aversion, combined with the costs of adjusting the capital stock, means that firms reduce their demand for capital in
response to increased economic uncertainty. This reduction in supply overwhelms the precautionary savings motive of households,
leading to falls in investment which deplete the capital stock and trigger a long term fall in output. In general, this shock leads to
the co-movement to be expected in a recession for all macroeconomic aggregates except for consumption.
But what about consumption? The fall in the demand for new investment means that interest rates are now so low as to deter
savings. Consumers spend their incomes instead, causing an initial increase in consumption levels. Note that this increase is highly
transitory, as falling capital levels eventually drag down income, leading to a realistic recession within a few quarters. Both papers
by Bloom also find this initial consumption effect. While this bump is counter-factual, it is somewhat inevitable in this simple
model. This issue will be further tackled in the discussion section below.
In contrast to these straightforward effects, the effects of a second moment technology shock are somewhat perplexing. The
simultaneous fall of investment, combined with a slightly positive interest rate response suggests a reduction in investment supply.
This is paradoxical, since households would be expected to save in response to increase uncertainty. The reduction in hours worked,
combined with rising wages, corroborates this; it seems households are also not engaging in precautionary labor supply, as might
be expected. Perhaps household risk aversion is not set sufficiently high in the baseline calibration, or perhaps some other effect is
at work. This issue will be explored in the subsequent analysis.
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Comparing Magnitudes Finally, we make an important observation about the sizes of these effects. Note that for similarly
sized driving shock, the impulse responses to second moment shocks are always several orders of magnitude weaker than their first
moment counterparts. This suggests that in order for uncertainty shocks to drive a recession, the magnitude of such shocks must be
very large - possibly hundreds of times larger than a first moment technology shock with the same contractionary impact. Is a shock
of such size plausible? In the discussion section, I will present empirical evidence that the answer to this question is yes. While
real variables such as technology or consumer patience may not shift more than a few percent over the course of the business cycle,
there is reason to believe that perceptions about the variance of these quantities are highly variable.
7.2 The relative effects of household and firm risk aversion
As explained above, the behavior of the economy in this model is primarily driven by the impact of the shock on investment. This,
in turn, is driven by the interplay between households and firms, who control the supply and demand for investment respectively.
Therefore, the responses on both sides of the credit market to an uncertainty shock will depend on the risk aversion parameters σf
and σh.
Figure 19 shows how the response of the credit market changes for varying levels of firm and household risk aversion. We turn to
the second moment beta shock, and make two important observations. First, levels of investment and interest rates are negative and
strictly decreasing in σf , the parameter governing firm risk aversion. This indicates that as firms become increasingly risk averse,
the demand for investment shift leftwards. Picture a restaurant franchise closing some branches, or a factory eliminating some its
machinery; this is exactly the behavior we would expect as risk averse firm owners, uncertain of future demand, precautionarily
reduce the size of their capital stock.
Meanwhile, the degree of household risk aversion, σh controls the extent of precautionary savings on the part of households. This
savings represents an increase in the supply of investment and helps to counteract the cutting-back of firms. If savings is sufficiently
robust, this supply shift will dominate the credit market and lead to an increase in investment combined with a precipitous fall in
interest rates. We see this behavior played out here; as households become more risk adverse, the contraction in investment becomes
less pronounced and interest rates fall further. In this parameter domain, this effect is never enough to actually cause investment to
become positive.
What about a second moment shock to technology, rather than consumer preferences? Here, the results are again somewhat
surprising. First, note that investment levels sometimes rise as we increase risk aversion (the first line in the bottom left of figure
19), or are non-monotonic - first rising, then falling with σf (the forth line). What’s more, increasing household risk aversion
now leads to lower levels of investment and interest rates, the opposite as would be expected from an increase in the supply of
investment. In fact, the co-movement of investment and interest rates while σh changes looks rather like a demand-side effect,
rather than a supply side effect.
The solution to this puzzle may lie with the action of adjustment costs, which affect households both directly (via. an income
effect) and indirectly through the expected value of future factor prices. This relationship is explored in the next set of figures.
7.3 How Risk Aversion Interacts with Adjustment Costs
Figures 20 through 23 show the reaction of investment and interest rates plotted against firm risk aversion, for different values
of the adjustment cost parameter γ1. Note that the response of these variables depends strongly on the level of adjustment costs,
particularly for beta shocks. In the literature, the value of this parameter varies by several orders of magnitude. Estimates based on
micro-level evidence differ widely from those obtained by targeting macroeconomic aggregates, such as the investment to capital
ratio. However, note that while the slope of these lines vary as adjustment costs change, the overall response of the economy remains
contractionary under both shocks. Whether costs are essentially turned off (g1 =0.01), or whether they are as large as those used
in Basu and Bundick (2012), investment never crosses the x-axis. The next figure reports the same data, but for varying levels
of household risk aversion. For technology shocks, the consistent decline in investment as risk aversion increases again suggests
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households are not engaging in precautionary saving.
The next two figures repeat this exercise, but vary the convexity parameter on adjustment costs, γ2. Recent has emphasized the
role of non-convexities, and even fixed costs, in the adjustment of capital (Cooper & Haltiwanger, 2005, Hall, 2004) . This suggests
that the quadratic exponent on the popular form of adjustment costs used in this model is only a convention. Even admitting that
adjustment costs are convex, there is of course no a-priori reason to believe that the degree of convexity is always equal to two. The
figures show that the response of the economy depends heavily on the value of parameter, though the shocks remain contractionary
under the vast majority of parametrizations. What’s more, the elasticity of investment with respect to the risk aversion parameters
varies widely in γ2, with non-monotonic behavior exhibited in most cases.
7.4 Robustness to Shock Persistence
Varying the persistence of the first moment shocks has more straightforward effects. Note that while the impact of persistence on the
absolute magnitude of the response is significant, particularly in the range near one, the sign of the effect remains largely unchanged;
both second moment shocks consistently deliver a contraction, with the size of the contraction peaking, unsurprisingly, when the
shocks themselves are most persistent. These results differ from those reported in Yi (2006), who finds a very large impact of shock
persistence on investment and output.
8 Discussion
8.1 Sufficient Criteria for Demand Driven Recessions?
A comparison of this model and those discussed in the literature review will show the model is considerably simpler. In particular,
it lacks any form of nominal rigidities, multiple sectors, or search frictions. However, the model delivers a contractionary effect
under both types of uncertainty shocks across a broad range of parameter values, including varying levels of firm risk aversion and
adjustment costs. In light of the difficulties in generating realistic co-movement with a demand shock, this begs the question: what
are sufficient conditions for such a shock to produce realistic business cycle behavior? Above, I argued that corporate risk aversion
is the key, but here I wish to make a more subtle point. I suggest that the following two conditions are all that is necessary for
contractionary demand-side shocks:
1. Firms which maximize a discounted stream of expected future profits, rather than myopically maximizing profits in each
period
2. Some kind of concavity in returns to investment
Careful examination of the list of models in Table 1 reveals that all of the models possess these two features. Firms are forward
looking, either due to making an investment choice, or because nominal rigidities force firms to consider future periods when
adjusting prices. Concavity in returns to investment can take the form of risk aversion, as in my model, or any number of adjustment
or search frictions which punish firms for over-investing.
To illustrate this, consider a modified version of the model explored in this paper, but one in which firms maximize in-period
profits only. Since firms are now myopic, the investment decision now entirely falls on the shoulders of households, who are risk
averse and pay adjustment costs. In simple models of capital adjustment (such as those exploring Tobin’s Q), this setup is actually
much more common.
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Comparing these models side by side is revealing. The Euler equation defining household consumption is nearly identical to the
previous expression of capital demand for firms. In the new model, firms are no longer forward looking, and instead, myopically set
the marginal products of labor and capital to their respective factor prices.
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Figure 25 depicts the response of this economy to a second moment preference shock; note that the shock is now expansionary.
Without a reduction in firm demand stemming from forward looking behavior, the investment market is dominated by households’
precautionary behavior; in other words, it’s dominated by an expansion in supply leading to greater investment, and ultimately,
increased output.
8.2 The Right Uncertainty Shock
The papers which have considered second moment shocks to both technology and consumer preferences found largely similar
results; the same can be said in this model, at least as far as investment and output are concerned. However, from a economic
perspective, uncertainty in total factor productivity and uncertainty about consumer demand are certainly distinct concepts. This
difference is important because as discussed in the results section, the magnitude of second order shocks are weak in comparison
to their first order counterparts. As a result, second moment shocks must be greater than their first moment counterparts by several
orders of magnitude in order to drive observable changes in the economy. In this section, I’ll argue that agent’s uncertainty over to
consumer demand could approach these levels much more plausibly than agent’s uncertainty over total factor productivity.
Measuring Economic Uncertainty Various measures of the level of economic uncertainty are reported in the literature. Bloom
(2011) estimates uncertainty in total factor productivity using establishment level firm data and finds that the inter-quartile range
between establishments in a given business is countercylcical. However, these vary by no more than 15% over his thirty year sample.
In the model above, as parametrized, such shocks would be vastly insufficient to drive recessions of a realistic size.
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Measures of the uncertainty of consumer demand are considerably uncommon. Leduc & Liu attempt to measure this uncertainty
with three sources: the percentage of consumers reporting an "uncertain future" in the Michigan Survey of Consumers, a similar
measure for a survey of firm owners in the UK, and the VIX index. The latter is a measure of volatility constructed from stock
market data which is commonly used in the uncertainty literature. Again, though, none of these variables are observed to change by
more than 15 percent over the course of the business cycle. Much of the problem results from the nature of the measures themselves;
they are indicies constructed to range from 0 to 100. Such measures are not well suited for this quantitative exercise, where the
absolute level of uncertainty really matters.
While it’s difficult to characterize agent’s subjective level of uncertainty, it is possible to evaluate the information set used by
agents to make future decisions. He (2014) studies the differential delivery of pessimistic news across the United States during
the previous two recessions. By combining information on newspaper subscribership with automatic content analysis of newspaper
articles, it’s possible to estimate the quantity of pessimistic news delivered to each US county by each news source. Figure 15 plots
the variance of this information as a function of time. The methods used to compute this graph are discussed in the paper; for our
purposes, it’s sufficient to understand that this variable characterizes the dispersion of news about the economy, as experience by
readers in a particular US county. This number will be equal to zero if all newspapers sources in a given county report the same
number of economically pessimistic articles in a given quarter, or if all readers in a county subscribe to the same source. Averaging
across the United States, we find that this variable increases by roughly two orders of magnitude during economic contractions.
Figure 15: County level measures of the dispersion of pessimistic news. National average is plotted for past two recession.
On larger geographic scales, the level of news pessimism with regards to the economy varies strongly geographically. Pic 16
depicts this variation, expressed as percentage deviation from the national mean. Imagine that the manager of a large restaurant
franchise receives information from his various subsidiaries across the country. If each subsidiary reports the average level of
pessimistic news circulating in that county, the number of different opinions heard by this manager would be substantial, and would
increase dramatically as the economy begins to contract. Therefore, it is quite plausible that uncertainty with regards to consumer
demand could vary by several orders of magnitude, as the above model requires.
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Figure 16: Geographic variation in pessimistic news delivery, Q2 2008.
8.3 Fixing the Consumption Overshoot
There remains one problem with the model: the consumption overshoot experienced initially as interest rates fall and households
reduce savings. Bloom also finds this effect in both of his papers; he deals with it by simultaneously introducing a first order shock to
technology. If the magnitude of this shock is correctly calibrated, it will cancel out the increase in consumption and deliver realistic
co-movement across all macroeconomic variables. However, given that the intention of this literature is to suggest an alternative to
technology shocks, this solution seems sub-optimal.
A more realistic way to deal with the issue would be to introduce search and matching into the financial section. Consider the
situation on the eve of a recession, it’s very likely that consumers are reducing consumption and saving more money. But this does
not necessarily have to mean that investment must rise. In reality, savings and investment don’t automatically equate; there is the
entire financial industry devoted to matching the two. If households wish to save but firms don’t wish to borrow, excess capital can
simply sit around in bank vaults. This is analogous to excess inventories in good search and matching, and to unemployment in the
labor market - there’s nothing mysterious about financial markets not clearing immediately. Such a model would allow the above
effects to operate without the counter-factual overshoot in consumption, and would be an interesting avenue for future work.
9 Conclusion
The DSGE literature has long recognized the difficulty of generating realistic business cycle dynamics using shocks to aggregate
demand. In contrast to intuition, a sudden reduction in consumer demand leads to economic expansion, since resources which
would otherwise be consumed are instead used for investment. This paper proposes a novel mechanism to resolve this issue: risk
averse behavior on the side of firms. It finds that even in a bare-bones DSGE framework, risk-averse firms can deliver realistic
business cycle co-movement in response to demand shocks triggered by increased economic uncertainty. These results suggest that
uncertainty, and in particular, firms’ uncertainty with regards to future consumer demand, plays a significant role in business cycle
contraction.
45
Part III
Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles per Person -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗
(0.000) (0.049)
(1st lag) -0.0015 0.0002
(0.150) (0.794)
APP, No local/jobs -0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0021
(0.000) (0.151)
(1st lag) 0.0016 -0.0017
(0.201) (0.286)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0146
(0.001) (0.304)
(1st lag) 0.0025 0.0141
(0.856) (0.348)
Observations 86655 86655 86655 86655 86655 86655
R2 0.889 0.966 0.966 0.970 0.966 0.970
F 1.9e+04 814.6556 814.7534 628.7516 815.0341 628.6528
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. All specifications include the covariates listed in table 4. For full table with all covariates, see appendix.
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Table 8: Effects of Pessimistic News on Logged Total Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles Per Reader -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0000
(0.000) (0.931)
(1st lag) -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0003∗
(0.000) (0.099)
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.0008∗∗ -0.0007∗
(0.036) (0.074)
(1st lag) -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.827) (0.340)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗
(0.008) (0.041)
(1st lag) -0.0007 0.0012
(0.617) (0.459)
Observations 86565 86565 86565 86565 86565 86565
R2 0.889 0.966 0.966 0.970 0.966 0.970
F 1.9e+04 813.7174 813.8060 628.0047 814.2308 627.9109
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. All specifications include the covariates listed in table 4. For full table with all covariates, see appendix.
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Table 9: Effects of Pessimistic News on Logged Hiring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles per Person 0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004)
(1st lag) -0.0583∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗
(0.000) (0.025)
APP, No local/jobs -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗
(0.001) (0.030)
(1st lag) -0.0068∗∗ -0.0051
(0.023) (0.174)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.0983∗∗∗ -0.0298
(0.004) (0.403)
(1st lag) -0.0458 0.0022
(0.215) (0.952)
Observations 85755 85755 85755 85755 85755 85755
R2 0.642 0.828 0.828 0.849 0.828 0.849
F 4.2e+03 134.7811 134.7913 107.1097 134.8174 107.0764
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. All specifications include the covariates listed in table 4. For full table with all covariates, see appendix.
5. Hiring refers to new stable hires, defined as total number of workers who were new hires by the employer in the last quarter and are
full-quarter employed in the current quarter.
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Table 10: Effects of Pessimistic News on Logged Hiring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles Per Reader 0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
(1st lag) -0.0151∗∗∗ -0.0004
(0.000) (0.438)
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006)
(1st lag) -0.0010 -0.0003
(0.259) (0.811)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0076∗∗
(0.000) (0.028)
(1st lag) -0.0019 0.0017
(0.587) (0.685)
Observations 85665 85665 85665 85665 85665 85665
R2 0.642 0.828 0.828 0.849 0.828 0.849
F 4.1e+03 134.5771 134.5862 106.9317 134.6335 106.9090
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. All specifications include the covariates listed in table 4. For full table with all covariates, see appendix.
5. Hiring refers to new stable hires, defined as total number of workers who were new hires by the employer in the last quarter and are
full-quarter employed in the current quarter.
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Table 11: Effects of Pessimistic News on Logged Separations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles per Person -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0005
(0.000) (0.828)
(1st lag) 0.0056∗∗ -0.0042∗
(0.017) (0.059)
APP, No local/jobs -0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0020
(0.003) (0.655)
(1st lag) 0.0014 -0.0091∗∗
(0.708) (0.025)
No Local/Jobs, Natl 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0062
(0.001) (0.871)
(1st lag) -0.1693∗∗∗ -0.0437
(0.000) (0.298)
Observations 86370 86370 86370 86370 86370 86370
R2 0.604 0.759 0.759 0.799 0.759 0.799
F 3.6e+03 88.7270 88.7311 75.9488 88.7559 75.9443
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. All specifications include the covariates listed in table 4. For full table with all covariates, see appendix.
5. Separations refers to separations from stable employment, defined as the total number of workers who are employed for the entire
previous quarter at some employer but are not employed at that employer in the current quarter.
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Table 12: Effects of Pessimistic News on Logged Separations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles Per Reader -0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0008
(0.000) (0.195)
(1st lag) 0.0003 -0.0021∗∗∗
(0.539) (0.001)
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.0015 0.0010
(0.154) (0.421)
(1st lag) -0.0011 -0.0028∗∗
(0.298) (0.011)
No Local/Jobs, Natl 0.0044 -0.0002
(0.281) (0.943)
(1st lag) -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.0027
(0.009) (0.439)
Observations 86280 86280 86280 86280 86280 86280
R2 0.604 0.759 0.759 0.799 0.759 0.799
F 3.6e+03 88.6772 88.6685 75.8730 88.6669 75.8634
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. All specifications include the covariates listed in table 4. For full table with all covariates, see appendix.
5. Separations refers to separations from stable employment, defined as the total number of workers who are employed for the entire
previous quarter at some employer but are not employed at that employer in the current quarter.
Table 13: Yearly Effects on Log. Tot. Employment During the Past Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2007 2008 2009 2010
APP, No Local/Jobs, Natl. -0.0885∗∗∗ -0.0900 -0.0143 0.4471
(0.001) (0.236) (0.489) (0.640)
Observations 11584 11584 11584 5791
R2 0.988 0.989 0.988 0.994
F 232.7322 254.4766 221.5136 144.8126
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Standard errors clustered at state-by-county level.
3. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in tables above.
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Table 14: Yearly Effects on Logged Hiring During the Past Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2007 2008 2009 2010
APP, No Local/Jobs, Natl. -0.2381∗∗ -0.3261 -0.0155 3.4339
(0.019) (0.215) (0.791) (0.466)
(1st lag) -0.0051 -0.2989∗∗ 0.1202∗∗ -1.9327
(0.978) (0.027) (0.040) (0.397)
Observations 11566 11569 11564 5774
R2 0.906 0.898 0.883 0.925
F 26.2675 24.0082 20.7785 11.4176
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Standard errors clustered at state-by-county level.
3. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in tables above.
Table 15: Yearly Effects on Logged Separations During the Past Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2007 2008 2009 2010
APP, No Local/Jobs, Natl. 0.0556 -0.0744 -0.1600∗∗ -2.2953
(0.666) (0.836) (0.020) (0.677)
(1st lag) 0.1015 -0.3283 -0.0838 0.6723
(0.529) (0.109) (0.373) (0.819)
Observations 11575 11574 11573 5784
R2 0.845 0.858 0.827 0.902
F 15.0008 16.5641 13.1132 8.5649
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Standard errors clustered at state-by-county level.
3. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in tables above.
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Table 16: Impact of News by NAICS Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sector Coeff. 1/Coeff. p News-Worth
Accommodation and food
services
-68.77 -0.01 0.220 1.33
Administrative and waste
management services
-62.2*** 1.00 0.010 0.03
Construction -40.61* -0.02 0.070 0.27
Retail trade -33.84*** -0.03 0.000 0.44
Transportation and
warehousing
-30.68*** -0.03 0.000 1.41
Real estate and rental and
leasing
-24.55*** -0.04 0.010 4.77
Mining -21.49** -0.05 0.050 4.48
Finance and insurance -13.36* -0.07 0.080 8.64
Educational services -8.4 -0.12 0.660 20.64
Information -5.6 -0.18 0.510 1.60
Wholesale trade -3.92 -0.25 0.590 0.04
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and hunting
2.04 0.49 0.870 1.95
Utilities 4.93 0.20 0.220 127.35
Manufacturing 24.29 0.04 0.340 0.36
Management of companies
and enterprises
25.77 0.04 0.170 0.00
Professional, scientific, and
technical services
25.96 0.04 0.400 1.13
Health care and social
assistance
30.44 0.03 0.110 6.27
Arts, entertainment, and
recreation
31.26 0.03 0.180 4.78
1. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in Table ??. Dependent
variable is log of total employment
2. All coefficients scaled by 10,000 for readability.
Table 16: This table displays the effects of news disaggregated by industry, as well as an independent measure of news-worthiness.
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Table 17: Articles Per Person, Single Source Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot. Emp. Hires Seps. Tot. Emp. Hires Seps.
APP, No Local/Jobs -0.0020 -0.0056 0.0016
(0.253) (0.235) (0.830)
(1st lag) -0.0047∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0114∗
(0.015) (0.001) (0.078)
APP, No Local/Jobs, Natl. -0.0243 -0.1015∗ 0.1435∗
(0.237) (0.064) (0.051)
(1st lag) -0.0508∗∗ -0.0851 -0.2560∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.177) (0.001)
Observations 30749 30415 30650 30749 30415 30650
R2 0.967 0.832 0.816 0.967 0.832 0.816
F 704.7075 118.0309 51.3981 704.8111 117.9940 51.4204
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in Table 6.
3. Single source counties are defined as counties in which at least 85 percent of all subscriptions are to the same newspaper.
Table 18: Articles Per Reader, Single Source Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot. Emp. Hires Seps. Tot. Emp. Hires Seps.
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.0003 -0.0024∗∗ 0.0009
(0.569) (0.041) (0.620)
(1st lag) -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0023∗ -0.0034∗
(0.007) (0.059) (0.066)
APR, No Local/Jobs, Natl. 0.0009 -0.0127 0.0090
(0.655) (0.109) (0.124)
(1st lag) -0.0037 -0.0014 -0.0107
(0.313) (0.822) (0.149)
Observations 30659 30325 30560 30659 30325 30560
R2 0.967 0.832 0.816 0.967 0.832 0.816
F 702.6174 117.5406 51.2664 702.1828 117.4716 51.2578
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in Table 6.
3. Single source counties are defined as counties in which at least 85 percent of all subscriptions are to the same newspaper.
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Table 19: Articles Per Person, Excluding Urban Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot. Emp. Hires Seps. Tot. Emp. Hires Seps.
APP, No Local/Jobs -0.0027 -0.0112∗∗ 0.0008
(0.188) (0.030) (0.901)
(1st lag) -0.0015 -0.0077 -0.0102∗
(0.480) (0.133) (0.075)
APP, No Local/Jobs, Natl. -0.0221 -0.0321 -0.0200
(0.176) (0.454) (0.639)
(1st lag) 0.0257 -0.0038 -0.0183
(0.139) (0.932) (0.706)
Observations 81176 80276 80891 81176 80276 80891
R2 0.967 0.833 0.782 0.967 0.833 0.782
F 547.1458 92.5749 66.8497 547.0950 92.5354 66.8446
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in Table 6.
3. Urban areas are defined as counties with popluation density greater than 500 persons per sq. mile.
Table 20: Articles Per Reader, Excluding Urban Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot. Emp. Hires Seps. Tot. Emp. Hires Seps.
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.0008∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0009
(0.098) (0.007) (0.538)
(1st lag) -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0027∗∗
(0.475) (0.840) (0.029)
APR, No Local/Jobs, Natl. -0.0038∗∗ -0.0076∗∗ -0.0011
(0.034) (0.034) (0.761)
(1st lag) 0.0014 0.0011 -0.0018
(0.404) (0.795) (0.617)
Observations 81086 80186 80801 81086 80186 80801
R2 0.967 0.833 0.782 0.967 0.833 0.782
F 546.4049 92.3928 66.7716 546.3550 92.3726 66.7639
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Specification identical to columns (4) and (6) in Table 6.
3. Urban areas are defined as counties with popluation density greater than 500 persons per sq. mile.
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Part IV
Figures
Figure 17: Impulse Response Functions for Technology Shocks in the Baseline Model.
"Pr" denotes in-period profits. All deviations expressed as percentage deviation from the ergodic mean.
Figure 18: Impulse Response Functions for Consumer Preference Shocks in the Baseline Model - All deviations expressed as
percentage deviation from the ergodic mean. Note that the initial response of consumption is anticyclical due to savings behavior.
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Investment Interest Rates
Figure 19: Responses of Investment and Interest Rates While Varying Household Risk Aversion (Sigmah), for a second moment
consumer preference shock (top), a second moment technology shock (bottom).
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Investment Interest Rates
Figure 20: Differential responses of investment and interest rates while varying firm risk aversion (Sigmaf ), for a second mo-
ment consumer preference shock (top), a second moment technology shock (bottom). Note the non-monotonicity in the repose,
particularly for second moment technology shocks.
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Investment Interest Rates
Figure 21: Differential responses of investment and interest rates while varying household risk aversion (Sigmah), for a second
moment consumer preference shock (top), a second moment technology shock (bottom).
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Investment Interest Rates
Figure 22: Differential responses of investment and interest rates while varying firm risk aversion (Sigmaf ), for a second moment
consumer preference shock (top), a second moment technology shock (bottom).
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Investment Interest Rates
Figure 23: Differential responses of investment and interest rates while varying household risk aversion (Sigmah), for a second
moment consumer preference shock (top), a second moment technology shock (bottom). Note the non-monotonicity in the reponse
for many values of gamma.
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Investment Interest Rates
Figure 24: Differential responses of investment and interest rates while varying the persistence of shocks, for a second moment
consumer preference shock (top), a second moment technology shock (bottom). Baseline calibration is used.
Figure 25: Impulse Response Functions for Consumer Preference Shocks With Myopic Firms. Note that the demand shock is now
expansionary.
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10 Appendix
A - Quotes related to Buffet’s Hypothesis (See Introduction)
“The principal cause of the economic slowdown was the collapse of the global credit boom and the ensuing financial
crisis, which has affected asset values, credit conditions, and consumer and business confidence around the world. The
immediate trigger of the crisis was the end of housing booms in the United States and other countries and the associated
problems in mortgage markets, notably the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market.”
- Ben Bernake, Semiannual Monetary Report to Congress
“Right now, our economy is trapped in a vicious cycle: the turmoil on Wall Street means a new round of belt-
tightening for families and businesses on Main Street... these extraordinary stresses on our financial system require
extraordinary policy responses.”
- Barack Obama, Speech (2009)
Graeme Leach, Chief Economist at IoD said: “Business is battening down the hatches in the expectation that the
recession will continue for the rest of the year. “That is bad news for the economy at large, because decisions to invest
money or take on more staff are being postponed until things look up. He commented that the combination of low
economic confidence and delayed business decisions created a “vicious cycle”.
- Miranda Dobson, Business Daily
“While you can’t talk a strong economy into a weak one, maybe we’re making things worse by focusing on the
negative news. You can’t escape the R-word these days. The question of whether the U.S. is in a recession - or in the
process of sliding into one - dominates economic analysis and financial reporting, as well as conversations at work and
around the kitchen table.”
- Chris Farrell, Bloomberg Business Week
B - Regression of Jobs on Newspaper Penetration
As explained in the identification section, employment and APP may be correlated if employment is correlated with newspaper
penetration. We might expect, for example, that more people subscribe to newspapers when times are good. The above regression
estimates the effects of employment on newspaper penetration, controlling for a number of observables and using county and state-
by-quarter fixed effects.
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Table 21: Effects of Employment on Newspaper Penetration
(1)
Cnty, St*Qtr
Total Employment Per Person 0.01967∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. Hispanic -0.33889∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. White -0.73187∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. Black -0.99587∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. Asian -1.76930∗∗∗
(0.000)
Population -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00006∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. Some HS -0.00004
(0.997)
Pct. Comp. HS 0.06264∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. Some College 0.09831∗∗∗
(0.000)
Pct. Comp. College -0.05844∗∗∗
(0.000)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00027∗∗
(0.027)
Observations 86655
R2 0.982
F 1.1e+03
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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C - Full Tables with All Covariates
The tables below display the full versions of regressions of APP and APR on various measures of employment (tables ?? through
12). These show point estimates for the demographic controls and the interactions between sectoral composition and national GDP,
in addition to the estimates for the effects of news which are included in the smaller version. For a detailed explanation of why these
covariates were chosen, please see the identification section.
Table 22: Effects of Pessimistic News on Total Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles per Person -0.00914∗∗∗ -0.00127∗∗
(0.000) (0.049)
(1st lag) -0.00146 0.00019
(0.150) (0.794)
APP, No local/jobs -0.00417∗∗∗ -0.00207
(0.000) (0.151)
(1st lag) 0.00163 -0.00166
(0.201) (0.286)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.04291∗∗∗ -0.01465
(0.001) (0.304)
(1st lag) 0.00252 0.01410
(0.856) (0.348)
Pct. Hispanic 0.00717∗ 0.36753∗∗ 0.36799∗∗ 0.28325∗∗∗ 0.36928∗∗ 0.28247∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.022) (0.022) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000)
Pct. White -0.04812∗∗∗ -1.28971∗∗∗ -1.28754∗∗∗ 0.59422∗∗ -1.26441∗∗∗ 0.58813∗∗
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024) (0.006) (0.026)
Pct. Black -0.07702∗∗∗ -1.71781∗∗∗ -1.71706∗∗∗ -0.09732 -1.69267∗∗∗ -0.10600
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.724) (0.001) (0.701)
Pct. Asian 0.13754∗∗∗ -2.08591∗∗∗ -2.06294∗∗∗ 1.14163∗∗∗ -2.01674∗∗∗ 1.06410∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Population 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00000 0.00000
(0.000) (0.761) (0.776) (0.548) (0.889) (0.850)
Pct. Some HS -0.07415∗∗∗ 0.07148 0.07163 0.03281 0.07474 0.03201
(0.000) (0.429) (0.428) (0.282) (0.408) (0.294)
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Pct. Comp. HS -0.17998∗∗∗ 0.00196 0.00193 0.04906∗∗ 0.00201 0.04969∗∗
(0.000) (0.974) (0.974) (0.033) (0.973) (0.031)
Pct. Some College -0.05414∗∗∗ 0.05776 0.05762 0.01206 0.05455 0.01243
(0.000) (0.511) (0.512) (0.686) (0.534) (0.678)
Pct. Comp. College 0.18298∗∗∗ 0.08439 0.08445 0.06948∗ 0.08495 0.07006∗
(0.000) (0.333) (0.333) (0.054) (0.328) (0.052)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00135∗∗∗ 0.00714∗∗∗ 0.00714∗∗∗ 0.00560∗∗∗ 0.00710∗∗∗ 0.00560∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newspaper Penetration 0.10038∗∗∗ 0.03193 0.03154 0.05185∗∗∗ 0.02835 0.05145∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.226) (0.232) (0.000) (0.286) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS11 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001 0.00005 0.00001 0.00005
(0.000) (0.909) (0.916) (0.525) (0.899) (0.520)
Sec*GDP NAICS21 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00062∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00062∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS22 0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00026∗ -0.00026∗ -0.00030∗∗∗ -0.00026∗ -0.00030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.090) (0.091) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS23 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00024 0.00024 0.00031∗∗∗ 0.00024 0.00031∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.116) (0.116) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS42 0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00033∗∗ 0.00033∗∗ 0.00008 0.00033∗∗ 0.00009
(0.000) (0.036) (0.037) (0.207) (0.037) (0.184)
Sec*GDP NAICS44 0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00008 -0.00001 0.00008
(0.000) (0.976) (0.978) (0.462) (0.983) (0.476)
Sec*GDP NAICS48 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.00027∗∗∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.00027∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.029) (0.030) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS49 -0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00028 0.00028 0.00038∗∗∗ 0.00029 0.00038∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.548) (0.547) (0.008) (0.543) (0.007)
Sec*GDP NAICS51 -0.00015∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00105∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00104∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS52 -0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00017 -0.00018 -0.00045∗∗∗ -0.00017 -0.00045∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.473) (0.467) (0.000) (0.477) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS53 -0.00017∗∗∗ -0.00060 -0.00060 -0.00027 -0.00058 -0.00027
(0.000) (0.181) (0.186) (0.374) (0.193) (0.378)
Sec*GDP NAICS54 -0.00011∗∗∗ 0.00023∗∗∗ 0.00024∗∗∗ 0.00027∗ 0.00023∗∗∗ 0.00027∗
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(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.070) (0.001) (0.068)
Sec*GDP NAICS55 -0.00015∗∗∗ -0.00055∗∗ -0.00055∗∗ -0.00029∗∗ -0.00056∗∗ -0.00029∗∗
(0.000) (0.023) (0.024) (0.013) (0.023) (0.011)
Sec*GDP NAICS56 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00005 -0.00016 -0.00005
(0.000) (0.321) (0.319) (0.398) (0.336) (0.428)
Sec*GDP NAICS61 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00004
(0.000) (0.848) (0.854) (0.249) (0.839) (0.265)
Sec*GDP NAICS62 0.00000∗∗ 0.00005 0.00005 0.00009∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.00009∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.475) (0.480) (0.005) (0.418) (0.005)
Sec*GDP NAICS71 -0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00009∗ -0.00007 -0.00009∗
(0.000) (0.565) (0.565) (0.067) (0.541) (0.070)
Sec*GDP NAICS72 -0.00008∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00022∗∗∗ -0.00024∗∗∗ -0.00022∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS81 0.00010∗∗∗ -0.00051 -0.00050 0.00009 -0.00051 0.00009
(0.000) (0.138) (0.140) (0.537) (0.137) (0.531)
Sec*GDP NAICS92 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00016∗ -0.00016∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00016∗ -0.00011∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.071) (0.071) (0.002) (0.078) (0.002)
Sec*GDP NAICS99 0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00028∗∗∗ -0.00029∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00029∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 86655 86655 86655 86655 86655 86655
R2 0.889 0.966 0.966 0.970 0.966 0.970
F 1.9e+04 8.1e+02 8.1e+02 6.3e+02 8.2e+02 6.3e+02
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
Table 23: Effects of Pessimistic News on Total Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles Per Reader -0.00188∗∗∗ -0.00002
(0.000) (0.931)
(1st lag) -0.00099∗∗∗ -0.00031∗
(0.000) (0.099)
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.00076∗∗ -0.00074∗
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(0.036) (0.074)
(1st lag) -0.00008 -0.00044
(0.827) (0.340)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.00537∗∗∗ -0.00360∗∗
(0.008) (0.041)
(1st lag) -0.00067 0.00119
(0.617) (0.459)
Pct. Hispanic 0.00811∗ 0.36861∗∗ 0.36903∗∗ 0.27728∗∗∗ 0.36911∗∗ 0.28559∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.022) (0.022) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000)
Pct. White -0.04908∗∗∗ -1.29668∗∗∗ -1.29744∗∗∗ 0.58991∗∗ -1.27599∗∗∗ 0.58851∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.005) (0.026)
Pct. Black -0.07723∗∗∗ -1.71899∗∗∗ -1.72343∗∗∗ -0.09156 -1.69029∗∗∗ -0.09082
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.740) (0.001) (0.742)
Pct. Asian 0.13668∗∗∗ -2.13598∗∗∗ -2.11563∗∗∗ 1.08684∗∗∗ -2.11005∗∗∗ 1.04840∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Population 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00000
(0.000) (0.773) (0.803) (0.515) (0.810) (0.698)
Pct. Some HS -0.08104∗∗∗ 0.07699 0.07718 0.04002 0.07787 0.03894
(0.000) (0.397) (0.396) (0.197) (0.392) (0.209)
Pct. Comp. HS -0.17606∗∗∗ 0.00127 0.00191 0.05028∗∗ 0.00052 0.04942∗∗
(0.000) (0.983) (0.975) (0.031) (0.993) (0.033)
Pct. Some College -0.05148∗∗∗ 0.05876 0.05851 0.01375 0.05750 0.01340
(0.000) (0.505) (0.507) (0.647) (0.513) (0.655)
Pct. Comp. College 0.17646∗∗∗ 0.08767 0.08753 0.07264∗∗ 0.08619 0.07381∗∗
(0.000) (0.316) (0.317) (0.044) (0.323) (0.041)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00133∗∗∗ 0.00715∗∗∗ 0.00714∗∗∗ 0.00561∗∗∗ 0.00712∗∗∗ 0.00561∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newspaper Penetration 0.08351∗∗∗ 0.03237 0.03266 0.05258∗∗∗ 0.03293 0.05087∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.220) (0.216) (0.000) (0.213) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS11 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001 0.00005 0.00001 0.00005
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(0.000) (0.906) (0.914) (0.522) (0.900) (0.519)
Sec*GDP NAICS21 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00062∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00063∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS22 0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00026∗ -0.00026∗ -0.00030∗∗∗ -0.00026∗ -0.00030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.091) (0.091) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS23 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00025 0.00025 0.00031∗∗∗ 0.00024 0.00031∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.113) (0.113) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS42 0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00033∗∗ 0.00033∗∗ 0.00008 0.00032∗∗ 0.00008
(0.000) (0.037) (0.039) (0.230) (0.040) (0.219)
Sec*GDP NAICS44 0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00008 -0.00000 0.00008
(0.000) (0.967) (0.969) (0.477) (0.991) (0.472)
Sec*GDP NAICS48 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.00027∗∗∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.00027∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.028) (0.028) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS49 -0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00028 0.00028 0.00038∗∗∗ 0.00028 0.00038∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.548) (0.548) (0.008) (0.546) (0.008)
Sec*GDP NAICS51 -0.00015∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00104∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00104∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS52 -0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00017 -0.00018 -0.00045∗∗∗ -0.00017 -0.00045∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.473) (0.465) (0.000) (0.469) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS53 -0.00018∗∗∗ -0.00061 -0.00060 -0.00027 -0.00060 -0.00027
(0.000) (0.177) (0.182) (0.375) (0.179) (0.367)
Sec*GDP NAICS54 -0.00011∗∗∗ 0.00024∗∗∗ 0.00024∗∗∗ 0.00027∗ 0.00024∗∗∗ 0.00027∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.001) (0.068)
Sec*GDP NAICS55 -0.00015∗∗∗ -0.00055∗∗ -0.00055∗∗ -0.00028∗∗ -0.00056∗∗ -0.00029∗∗
(0.000) (0.024) (0.025) (0.014) (0.024) (0.012)
Sec*GDP NAICS56 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00005 -0.00016 -0.00005
(0.000) (0.328) (0.326) (0.429) (0.343) (0.456)
Sec*GDP NAICS61 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00004 0.00002 -0.00003
(0.000) (0.834) (0.840) (0.267) (0.819) (0.287)
Sec*GDP NAICS62 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00005 0.00005 0.00009∗∗∗ 0.00005 0.00009∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.461) (0.466) (0.004) (0.437) (0.004)
Sec*GDP NAICS71 -0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00006 -0.00007 -0.00009∗ -0.00007 -0.00009∗
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(0.000) (0.569) (0.562) (0.065) (0.544) (0.066)
Sec*GDP NAICS72 -0.00008∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00022∗∗∗ -0.00024∗∗∗ -0.00021∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS81 0.00010∗∗∗ -0.00051 -0.00051 0.00008 -0.00051 0.00008
(0.000) (0.134) (0.135) (0.558) (0.135) (0.544)
Sec*GDP NAICS92 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00016∗ -0.00016∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00015∗ -0.00011∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.075) (0.074) (0.002) (0.079) (0.002)
Sec*GDP NAICS99 0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00028∗∗∗ -0.00028∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00028∗∗∗ -0.00025∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 86565 86565 86565 86565 86565 86565
R2 0.889 0.966 0.966 0.970 0.966 0.970
F 1.9e+04 8.1e+02 8.1e+02 6.3e+02 8.1e+02 6.3e+02
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
Table 24: Effects of Pessimistic News on Hiring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles per Person 0.01678∗∗∗ -0.00505∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004)
(1st lag) -0.05832∗∗∗ -0.00380∗∗
(0.000) (0.025)
APP, No local/jobs -0.00992∗∗∗ -0.00811∗∗
(0.001) (0.030)
(1st lag) -0.00676∗∗ -0.00507
(0.023) (0.174)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.09832∗∗∗ -0.02980
(0.004) (0.403)
(1st lag) -0.04585 0.00223
(0.215) (0.952)
Pct. Hispanic 0.20508∗∗∗ 0.65581∗∗ 0.65648∗∗ 0.38527∗∗ 0.65850∗∗ 0.39006∗∗
(0.000) (0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.024) (0.041)
Pct. White -0.26905∗∗∗ -2.40989∗∗∗ -2.40768∗∗∗ 0.96477 -2.35172∗∗∗ 0.94616
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(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.183) (0.004) (0.191)
Pct. Black -0.22035∗∗∗ -2.53664∗∗∗ -2.54283∗∗∗ 0.38781 -2.47452∗∗∗ 0.36053
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.602) (0.005) (0.628)
Pct. Asian -0.09447∗∗ -6.74724∗∗∗ -6.68838∗∗∗ 0.61250 -6.72971∗∗∗ 0.40570
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.496) (0.000) (0.654)
Population 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00007∗ 0.00007∗ 0.00009∗∗∗ 0.00007∗ 0.00007∗∗
(0.000) (0.066) (0.069) (0.008) (0.091) (0.027)
Pct. Some HS 0.33231∗∗∗ -0.08361 -0.08234 -0.05301 -0.07129 -0.05410
(0.000) (0.549) (0.555) (0.454) (0.610) (0.445)
Pct. Comp. HS -0.49159∗∗∗ -0.17535 -0.17509 -0.15000∗∗ -0.17520 -0.14789∗∗
(0.000) (0.110) (0.110) (0.018) (0.111) (0.020)
Pct. Some College 0.22591∗∗∗ 0.00333 0.00377 -0.08966 -0.00558 -0.09082
(0.000) (0.981) (0.978) (0.237) (0.968) (0.231)
Pct. Comp. College 0.60896∗∗∗ -0.18766 -0.18785 -0.17161∗ -0.18649 -0.16886∗
(0.000) (0.194) (0.193) (0.067) (0.198) (0.071)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00019 0.01588∗∗∗ 0.01588∗∗∗ 0.01060∗∗∗ 0.01575∗∗∗ 0.01060∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newspaper Penetration 0.03744∗∗∗ 0.07154 0.06956 0.03326 0.05930 0.02919
(0.000) (0.132) (0.142) (0.321) (0.218) (0.385)
Sec*GDP NAICS11 0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00004 -0.00010 -0.00003
(0.000) (0.499) (0.497) (0.789) (0.538) (0.805)
Sec*GDP NAICS21 0.00012∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.00144∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS22 -0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00099∗∗∗ 0.00099∗∗∗ 0.00080∗∗∗ 0.00100∗∗∗ 0.00079∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS23 0.00020∗∗∗ 0.00050∗ 0.00049∗ 0.00051∗∗∗ 0.00047∗ 0.00051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.056) (0.056) (0.007) (0.071) (0.008)
Sec*GDP NAICS42 0.00001 0.00053∗ 0.00052∗ 0.00013 0.00053∗ 0.00015
(0.401) (0.053) (0.057) (0.450) (0.052) (0.407)
Sec*GDP NAICS44 0.00042∗∗∗ -0.00029 -0.00029 -0.00004 -0.00029 -0.00004
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(0.000) (0.513) (0.512) (0.896) (0.508) (0.873)
Sec*GDP NAICS48 0.00016∗∗∗ 0.00028 0.00028 0.00025 0.00029 0.00025
(0.000) (0.177) (0.183) (0.106) (0.175) (0.107)
Sec*GDP NAICS49 -0.00002 0.00023 0.00023 0.00045 0.00025 0.00046
(0.192) (0.772) (0.768) (0.149) (0.756) (0.143)
Sec*GDP NAICS51 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00124∗∗∗ -0.00123∗∗∗ -0.00092∗∗∗ -0.00117∗∗∗ -0.00087∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sec*GDP NAICS52 -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00011 -0.00012 -0.00053∗∗ -0.00009 -0.00052∗∗
(0.000) (0.749) (0.737) (0.032) (0.789) (0.035)
Sec*GDP NAICS53 0.00014∗∗∗ -0.00165∗∗ -0.00163∗∗ -0.00151∗ -0.00156∗∗ -0.00151∗
(0.000) (0.043) (0.046) (0.094) (0.050) (0.094)
Sec*GDP NAICS54 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00007 -0.00007 0.00002 -0.00006 0.00002
(0.000) (0.510) (0.511) (0.856) (0.537) (0.824)
Sec*GDP NAICS55 -0.00005∗∗∗ -0.00036 -0.00036 0.00032 -0.00040 0.00030
(0.001) (0.291) (0.290) (0.216) (0.253) (0.251)
Sec*GDP NAICS56 0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00005 -0.00011 -0.00004
(0.003) (0.453) (0.444) (0.700) (0.511) (0.756)
Sec*GDP NAICS61 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00017 0.00017 0.00013 0.00018 0.00013
(0.000) (0.196) (0.199) (0.254) (0.184) (0.238)
Sec*GDP NAICS62 0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002
(0.000) (0.726) (0.735) (0.826) (0.866) (0.844)
Sec*GDP NAICS71 -0.00001 -0.00013 -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00013
(0.325) (0.413) (0.417) (0.369) (0.399) (0.370)
Sec*GDP NAICS72 -0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00075∗∗∗ -0.00075∗∗∗ -0.00056∗∗∗ -0.00071∗∗∗ -0.00055∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
Sec*GDP NAICS81 0.00003∗ -0.00196∗∗∗ -0.00196∗∗∗ -0.00015 -0.00197∗∗∗ -0.00015
(0.058) (0.005) (0.005) (0.659) (0.004) (0.664)
Sec*GDP NAICS92 -0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00000 -0.00015 -0.00000
(0.000) (0.300) (0.303) (0.999) (0.341) (0.988)
Sec*GDP NAICS99 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00033∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00033∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 85755 85755 85755 85755 85755 85755
R2 0.642 0.828 0.828 0.849 0.828 0.849
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F 4.2e+03 1.3e+02 1.3e+02 1.1e+02 1.3e+02 1.1e+02
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. Hiring refers to new stable hires, defined as total number of workers who were new hires by the employer in the last quarter and are
full-quarter employed in the current quarter.
Table 25: Effects of Pessimistic News on Hiring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles Per Reader 0.00534∗∗∗ -0.00163∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
(1st lag) -0.01507∗∗∗ -0.00035
(0.000) (0.438)
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.00282∗∗∗ -0.00278∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006)
(1st lag) -0.00101 -0.00029
(0.259) (0.811)
No Local/Jobs, Natl -0.01614∗∗∗ -0.00762∗∗
(0.000) (0.028)
(1st lag) -0.00187 0.00167
(0.587) (0.685)
Pct. Hispanic 0.20590∗∗∗ 0.66309∗∗ 0.66010∗∗ 0.36587∗ 0.65613∗∗ 0.38823∗∗
(0.000) (0.024) (0.024) (0.054) (0.025) (0.042)
Pct. White -0.26989∗∗∗ -2.46100∗∗∗ -2.46407∗∗∗ 0.94272 -2.40450∗∗∗ 0.93694
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.193) (0.003) (0.196)
Pct. Black -0.21930∗∗∗ -2.57792∗∗∗ -2.59465∗∗∗ 0.39573 -2.49018∗∗∗ 0.39527
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.595) (0.005) (0.595)
Pct. Asian -0.09717∗∗ -7.03732∗∗∗ -7.00522∗∗∗ 0.37913 -7.07648∗∗∗ 0.27336
(0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.674) (0.000) (0.762)
Population 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.00006 0.00008∗∗ 0.00006 0.00007∗∗
(0.000) (0.123) (0.117) (0.013) (0.198) (0.025)
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Pct. Some HS 0.30455∗∗∗ -0.07670 -0.07485 -0.03585 -0.07195 -0.03818
(0.000) (0.584) (0.593) (0.614) (0.609) (0.591)
Pct. Comp. HS -0.48205∗∗∗ -0.17589 -0.17366 -0.14811∗∗ -0.17931 -0.14959∗∗
(0.000) (0.108) (0.112) (0.020) (0.104) (0.019)
Pct. Some College 0.23133∗∗∗ 0.00527 0.00559 -0.08544 0.00457 -0.08594
(0.000) (0.970) (0.968) (0.262) (0.974) (0.258)
Pct. Comp. College 0.57208∗∗∗ -0.18196 -0.18219 -0.16026∗ -0.18529 -0.15724∗
(0.000) (0.208) (0.208) (0.086) (0.201) (0.092)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00024 0.01588∗∗∗ 0.01588∗∗∗ 0.01061∗∗∗ 0.01583∗∗∗ 0.01060∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newspaper Penetration -0.02268∗∗∗ 0.07828 0.07812 0.03518 0.07730 0.03065
(0.001) (0.102) (0.103) (0.292) (0.108) (0.361)
Sec*GDP NAICS11 0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00004 -0.00010 -0.00003
(0.000) (0.505) (0.505) (0.789) (0.543) (0.802)
Sec*GDP NAICS21 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.00145∗∗∗ 0.00143∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS22 -0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00098∗∗∗ 0.00099∗∗∗ 0.00079∗∗∗ 0.00098∗∗∗ 0.00079∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS23 0.00020∗∗∗ 0.00051∗ 0.00050∗ 0.00052∗∗∗ 0.00049∗ 0.00051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.051) (0.052) (0.006) (0.056) (0.007)
Sec*GDP NAICS42 0.00001 0.00053∗ 0.00052∗ 0.00014 0.00052∗ 0.00015
(0.340) (0.051) (0.055) (0.425) (0.053) (0.404)
Sec*GDP NAICS44 0.00042∗∗∗ -0.00028 -0.00029 -0.00003 -0.00027 -0.00003
(0.000) (0.519) (0.514) (0.906) (0.530) (0.905)
Sec*GDP NAICS48 0.00015∗∗∗ 0.00028 0.00028 0.00025 0.00028 0.00025
(0.000) (0.178) (0.184) (0.103) (0.182) (0.104)
Sec*GDP NAICS49 -0.00002 0.00024 0.00024 0.00046 0.00025 0.00046
(0.199) (0.767) (0.763) (0.149) (0.757) (0.145)
Sec*GDP NAICS51 -0.00008∗∗∗ -0.00118∗∗∗ -0.00117∗∗∗ -0.00088∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.00087∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sec*GDP NAICS52 -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00010 -0.00011 -0.00052∗∗ -0.00009 -0.00051∗∗
(0.000) (0.764) (0.754) (0.034) (0.792) (0.036)
Sec*GDP NAICS53 0.00012∗∗∗ -0.00163∗∗ -0.00161∗∗ -0.00152∗ -0.00162∗∗ -0.00154∗
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(0.000) (0.044) (0.046) (0.093) (0.039) (0.088)
Sec*GDP NAICS54 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00006 -0.00006 0.00002 -0.00006 0.00002
(0.000) (0.530) (0.528) (0.852) (0.552) (0.830)
Sec*GDP NAICS55 -0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00036 -0.00036 0.00032 -0.00040 0.00030
(0.000) (0.296) (0.293) (0.224) (0.255) (0.252)
Sec*GDP NAICS56 0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00005 -0.00010 -0.00004
(0.001) (0.476) (0.471) (0.731) (0.529) (0.773)
Sec*GDP NAICS61 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00018 0.00018 0.00013 0.00019 0.00014
(0.000) (0.179) (0.182) (0.230) (0.169) (0.218)
Sec*GDP NAICS62 0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00002
(0.000) (0.712) (0.723) (0.809) (0.800) (0.839)
Sec*GDP NAICS71 -0.00001 -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00013
(0.234) (0.419) (0.418) (0.364) (0.388) (0.365)
Sec*GDP NAICS72 -0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00074∗∗∗ -0.00074∗∗∗ -0.00055∗∗∗ -0.00070∗∗∗ -0.00054∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Sec*GDP NAICS81 0.00003∗∗ -0.00197∗∗∗ -0.00198∗∗∗ -0.00017 -0.00198∗∗∗ -0.00016
(0.042) (0.004) (0.004) (0.622) (0.004) (0.628)
Sec*GDP NAICS92 -0.00005∗∗∗ -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00000 -0.00015 0.00000
(0.000) (0.301) (0.299) (1.000) (0.332) (0.990)
Sec*GDP NAICS99 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00033∗∗∗ -0.00038∗∗∗ -0.00032∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 85665 85665 85665 85665 85665 85665
R2 0.642 0.828 0.828 0.849 0.828 0.849
F 4.1e+03 1.3e+02 1.3e+02 1.1e+02 1.3e+02 1.1e+02
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. Hiring refers to new stable hires, defined as total number of workers who were new hires by the employer in the last quarter and are
full-quarter employed in the current quarter.
Table 26: Effects of Pessimistic News on Separations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles per Person -0.02008∗∗∗ -0.00045
(0.000) (0.828)
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(1st lag) 0.00557∗∗ -0.00424∗
(0.017) (0.059)
APP, No local/jobs -0.01028∗∗∗ 0.00202
(0.003) (0.655)
(1st lag) 0.00137 -0.00914∗∗
(0.708) (0.025)
No Local/Jobs, Natl 0.09950∗∗∗ 0.00621
(0.001) (0.871)
(1st lag) -0.16935∗∗∗ -0.04368
(0.000) (0.298)
Pct. Hispanic 0.12381∗∗∗ -0.29944 -0.29816 0.18053 -0.29647 0.19017
(0.000) (0.232) (0.234) (0.423) (0.236) (0.399)
Pct. White -0.26540∗∗∗ -1.37592∗∗ -1.37454∗∗ 1.19830 -1.35690∗∗ 1.19302
(0.000) (0.033) (0.033) (0.126) (0.035) (0.128)
Pct. Black -0.15654∗∗∗ -2.11321∗∗∗ -2.11576∗∗∗ 0.24191 -2.08381∗∗∗ 0.23286
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.768) (0.003) (0.777)
Pct. Asian -0.27493∗∗∗ -3.52428∗∗∗ -3.48824∗∗∗ 1.07960 -3.49983∗∗∗ 1.03767
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.308) (0.000) (0.327)
Population 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.007) (0.026)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00006∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00006∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.100) (0.002) (0.089)
Pct. Some HS 0.35874∗∗∗ 0.21559∗ 0.21596∗ 0.09818 0.22317∗ 0.09941
(0.000) (0.069) (0.068) (0.301) (0.059) (0.294)
Pct. Comp. HS -0.22003∗∗∗ -0.23270∗∗∗ -0.23275∗∗∗ -0.13937∗ -0.23224∗∗∗ -0.13832∗
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.086) (0.010) (0.088)
Pct. Some College 0.25758∗∗∗ -0.07198 -0.07194 -0.13071 -0.07686 -0.13313
(0.000) (0.543) (0.544) (0.172) (0.515) (0.165)
Pct. Comp. College 0.68236∗∗∗ -0.01176 -0.01189 -0.01172 -0.01002 -0.00912
(0.000) (0.924) (0.923) (0.911) (0.935) (0.931)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00242∗∗∗ 0.00636∗∗∗ 0.00637∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00630∗∗∗ 0.00510∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newspaper Penetration 0.08780∗∗∗ -0.01426 -0.01517 0.09798∗∗∗ -0.02247 0.09317∗∗
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(0.000) (0.758) (0.743) (0.008) (0.628) (0.012)
Sec*GDP NAICS11 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00024∗ 0.00024∗ 0.00013 0.00024∗ 0.00013
(0.000) (0.070) (0.073) (0.437) (0.065) (0.435)
Sec*GDP NAICS21 0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00068∗∗ 0.00068∗∗ 0.00076∗∗∗ 0.00069∗∗ 0.00076∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.020) (0.021) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS22 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00019 -0.00003 -0.00019
(0.000) (0.900) (0.907) (0.501) (0.918) (0.500)
Sec*GDP NAICS23 0.00017∗∗∗ 0.00070∗∗∗ 0.00070∗∗∗ 0.00053∗∗∗ 0.00069∗∗∗ 0.00052∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Sec*GDP NAICS42 -0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00044∗ 0.00044∗ -0.00004 0.00045∗ -0.00003
(0.003) (0.080) (0.084) (0.851) (0.077) (0.869)
Sec*GDP NAICS44 0.00039∗∗∗ -0.00034 -0.00034 -0.00006 -0.00035 -0.00006
(0.000) (0.328) (0.329) (0.846) (0.316) (0.843)
Sec*GDP NAICS48 0.00008∗∗∗ 0.00014 0.00014 0.00016 0.00014 0.00017
(0.000) (0.617) (0.618) (0.491) (0.622) (0.488)
Sec*GDP NAICS49 -0.00002 0.00032 0.00033 0.00026 0.00032 0.00027
(0.219) (0.601) (0.597) (0.399) (0.602) (0.393)
Sec*GDP NAICS51 -0.00009∗∗∗ -0.00092∗∗∗ -0.00089∗∗∗ -0.00085∗∗∗ -0.00091∗∗∗ -0.00082∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009)
Sec*GDP NAICS52 -0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00017 0.00017 -0.00025 0.00018 -0.00024
(0.000) (0.524) (0.536) (0.243) (0.513) (0.244)
Sec*GDP NAICS53 0.00026∗∗∗ -0.00003 0.00000 0.00038 -0.00001 0.00039
(0.000) (0.956) (0.998) (0.640) (0.987) (0.637)
Sec*GDP NAICS54 -0.00010∗∗∗ 0.00008 0.00008 0.00010 0.00008 0.00010
(0.000) (0.341) (0.325) (0.433) (0.332) (0.423)
Sec*GDP NAICS55 -0.00008∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗ -0.00115∗∗ -0.00087∗∗ -0.00118∗∗∗ -0.00088∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Sec*GDP NAICS56 -0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00013 -0.00013 0.00009 -0.00013 0.00010
(0.000) (0.560) (0.555) (0.570) (0.561) (0.550)
Sec*GDP NAICS61 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.00006 -0.00003 0.00006 -0.00003
(0.005) (0.562) (0.568) (0.779) (0.555) (0.791)
Sec*GDP NAICS62 0.00000 -0.00018∗ -0.00018∗ -0.00005 -0.00017∗ -0.00004
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(0.625) (0.087) (0.082) (0.668) (0.098) (0.680)
Sec*GDP NAICS71 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00021 -0.00021 -0.00034∗ -0.00021 -0.00034∗
(0.001) (0.288) (0.291) (0.052) (0.290) (0.051)
Sec*GDP NAICS72 -0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00020 -0.00020 -0.00025∗ -0.00020 -0.00024∗
(0.000) (0.103) (0.102) (0.083) (0.112) (0.091)
Sec*GDP NAICS81 0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00048 -0.00046 -0.00027 -0.00049 -0.00026
(0.000) (0.297) (0.311) (0.427) (0.281) (0.446)
Sec*GDP NAICS92 -0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00027∗∗ -0.00027∗∗ -0.00022∗∗ -0.00027∗∗ -0.00022∗∗
(0.000) (0.034) (0.033) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039)
Sec*GDP NAICS99 -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00016∗∗ -0.00008 -0.00016∗∗
(0.000) (0.364) (0.354) (0.026) (0.358) (0.026)
Observations 86370 86370 86370 86370 86370 86370
R2 0.604 0.759 0.759 0.799 0.759 0.799
F 3.6e+03 88.72697 88.73107 75.94878 88.75585 75.94430
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. Separations refers to separations from stable employment, defined as the total number of workers who are employed for the entire
previous quarter at some employer but are not employed at that employer in the current quarter.
Table 27: Effects of Pessimistic News on Separations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Cnty, Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr Cnty, Qtr Cnty, St*Qtr
Articles Per Reader -0.00429∗∗∗ 0.00077
(0.000) (0.195)
(1st lag) 0.00035 -0.00207∗∗∗
(0.539) (0.001)
APR, No Local/Jobs -0.00146 0.00098
(0.154) (0.421)
(1st lag) -0.00107 -0.00279∗∗
(0.298) (0.011)
No Local/Jobs, Natl 0.00441 -0.00025
(0.281) (0.943)
(1st lag) -0.01202∗∗∗ -0.00273
(0.009) (0.439)
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Pct. Hispanic 0.12531∗∗∗ -0.29707 -0.29784 0.17013 -0.30186 0.18182
(0.000) (0.236) (0.234) (0.450) (0.228) (0.421)
Pct. White -0.26607∗∗∗ -1.39678∗∗ -1.40379∗∗ 1.18930 -1.38367∗∗ 1.18452
(0.000) (0.031) (0.030) (0.129) (0.032) (0.131)
Pct. Black -0.15433∗∗∗ -2.15288∗∗∗ -2.16704∗∗∗ 0.22838 -2.11753∗∗∗ 0.22785
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.781) (0.003) (0.782)
Pct. Asian -0.27553∗∗∗ -3.63995∗∗∗ -3.61601∗∗∗ 0.96171 -3.70087∗∗∗ 0.90861
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.388)
Population 0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗ -0.00000∗∗∗ -0.00000∗∗
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.008) (0.026)
Pop. Density (Persons/Sq. Mi) -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00011∗∗∗ -0.00006∗ -0.00012∗∗∗ -0.00007∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.095) (0.000) (0.066)
Pct. Some HS 0.33912∗∗∗ 0.22142∗ 0.22207∗ 0.10979 0.22391∗ 0.10817
(0.000) (0.062) (0.061) (0.250) (0.060) (0.256)
Pct. Comp. HS -0.22020∗∗∗ -0.23993∗∗∗ -0.23892∗∗∗ -0.14437∗ -0.24259∗∗∗ -0.14562∗
(0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.076) (0.007) (0.073)
Pct. Some College 0.25383∗∗∗ -0.07642 -0.07663 -0.13295 -0.07591 -0.13328
(0.000) (0.518) (0.517) (0.165) (0.520) (0.164)
Pct. Comp. College 0.66580∗∗∗ -0.01574 -0.01601 -0.01276 -0.01661 -0.01044
(0.000) (0.898) (0.896) (0.903) (0.892) (0.920)
Med. HH Income (Thousands) -0.00239∗∗∗ 0.00636∗∗∗ 0.00636∗∗∗ 0.00513∗∗∗ 0.00635∗∗∗ 0.00512∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newspaper Penetration 0.06416∗∗∗ -0.00957 -0.00919 0.09945∗∗∗ -0.01080 0.09670∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.835) (0.842) (0.007) (0.815) (0.009)
Sec*GDP NAICS11 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00024∗ 0.00024∗ 0.00013 0.00024∗ 0.00013
(0.000) (0.068) (0.070) (0.429) (0.063) (0.430)
Sec*GDP NAICS21 0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00068∗∗ 0.00068∗∗ 0.00076∗∗∗ 0.00069∗∗ 0.00076∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
Sec*GDP NAICS22 -0.00007∗∗∗ -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00019 -0.00004 -0.00019
(0.000) (0.894) (0.896) (0.502) (0.904) (0.502)
Sec*GDP NAICS23 0.00017∗∗∗ 0.00071∗∗∗ 0.00071∗∗∗ 0.00053∗∗∗ 0.00070∗∗∗ 0.00053∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Sec*GDP NAICS42 -0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00044∗ 0.00044∗ -0.00004 0.00044∗ -0.00004
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(0.003) (0.079) (0.085) (0.842) (0.080) (0.853)
Sec*GDP NAICS44 0.00039∗∗∗ -0.00035 -0.00035 -0.00006 -0.00035 -0.00006
(0.000) (0.324) (0.322) (0.836) (0.319) (0.832)
Sec*GDP NAICS48 0.00008∗∗∗ 0.00015 0.00014 0.00017 0.00014 0.00017
(0.000) (0.613) (0.615) (0.472) (0.617) (0.474)
Sec*GDP NAICS49 -0.00002 0.00033 0.00033 0.00027 0.00033 0.00027
(0.215) (0.595) (0.592) (0.393) (0.593) (0.393)
Sec*GDP NAICS51 -0.00009∗∗∗ -0.00090∗∗∗ -0.00088∗∗∗ -0.00082∗∗∗ -0.00087∗∗∗ -0.00081∗∗
(0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
Sec*GDP NAICS52 -0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00017 0.00017 -0.00025 0.00018 -0.00024
(0.000) (0.518) (0.535) (0.244) (0.498) (0.244)
Sec*GDP NAICS53 0.00025∗∗∗ -0.00003 0.00000 0.00039 0.00001 0.00039
(0.000) (0.965) (0.997) (0.638) (0.990) (0.637)
Sec*GDP NAICS54 -0.00010∗∗∗ 0.00008 0.00008 0.00010 0.00009 0.00011
(0.000) (0.328) (0.323) (0.421) (0.308) (0.415)
Sec*GDP NAICS55 -0.00008∗∗∗ -0.00115∗∗ -0.00115∗∗ -0.00086∗∗ -0.00117∗∗ -0.00087∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Sec*GDP NAICS56 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00013 -0.00013 0.00010 -0.00012 0.00010
(0.000) (0.576) (0.569) (0.534) (0.583) (0.525)
Sec*GDP NAICS61 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.00006 -0.00003 0.00006 -0.00003
(0.005) (0.550) (0.555) (0.801) (0.534) (0.809)
Sec*GDP NAICS62 0.00000 -0.00018∗ -0.00018∗ -0.00004 -0.00018∗ -0.00004
(0.370) (0.089) (0.087) (0.679) (0.096) (0.676)
Sec*GDP NAICS71 -0.00002∗∗∗ -0.00021 -0.00021 -0.00034∗ -0.00020 -0.00034∗
(0.001) (0.290) (0.285) (0.052) (0.297) (0.053)
Sec*GDP NAICS72 -0.00003∗∗∗ -0.00020 -0.00020 -0.00024∗ -0.00019 -0.00024∗
(0.000) (0.107) (0.106) (0.087) (0.121) (0.090)
Sec*GDP NAICS81 0.00006∗∗∗ -0.00049 -0.00048 -0.00029 -0.00049 -0.00028
(0.000) (0.282) (0.290) (0.403) (0.284) (0.422)
Sec*GDP NAICS92 -0.00004∗∗∗ -0.00027∗∗ -0.00027∗∗ -0.00022∗∗ -0.00027∗∗ -0.00022∗∗
(0.000) (0.036) (0.034) (0.043) (0.037) (0.042)
Sec*GDP NAICS99 -0.00001∗∗∗ -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00015∗∗ -0.00008 -0.00015∗∗
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(0.000) (0.372) (0.359) (0.030) (0.384) (0.030)
Observations 86280 86280 86280 86280 86280 86280
R2 0.604 0.759 0.759 0.799 0.759 0.799
F 3.6e+03 88.67725 88.66848 75.87301 88.66694 75.86339
1. P-values in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. Column names denote fixed effects specification, for example, columns (4) and (6) include county and state by quarter fixed effects.
3. Standard error clustered at county level for colums (2), (3), and (5); at state-by-quarter level for (4), (6).
4. Separations refers to separations from stable employment, defined as the total number of workers who are employed for the entire
previous quarter at some employer but are not employed at that employer in the current quarter.
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